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Customized Litigation:
The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable
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Abstract:
This article calls for a complete re-conceptualization of the procedural rules
governing modern litigation. Specifically, it suggests that litigants ought to be
given the opportunity to customize their litigation experience—that procedural
rules should be treated as default rules from which parties can mutually
negotiate deviations. Although they are not typically labeled as such, modest
examples of customization already occur both within the rules of civil
procedure and extra-judicially. This article argues that much greater tailoring
is possible, and it suggests three criteria for assessing how much deviation from
the current baseline is tolerable. This article argues that a judicial system that
presents an opportunity for customized litigation would be more procedurally
just, more efficient, and more accessible than one with only a set of nonnegotiable procedural rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Henry Ford once said, in reference to his Model T automobiles, “Any customer
can have a car painted any colour that he wants, so long as it is black.”1
Our judiciary has unfortunately embraced Henry Ford’s sense of consumer
choice. Courts today essentially tell disputants that they can have any color of
litigation they want, so long as it’s the one that already exists. Observers on
both sides of current debates about litigation seem to share in this vision of
litigation as a unitary, choice-less process. Proponents of litigation extol its
truth-seeking and justice-providing virtues. Critics point to the delay, expense,
and uncertainty that accompany litigation. And underlying both of these
commentaries is a relatively uniform vision of litigation—as if litigation
necessarily has a (single) color, with the only argument being about whether
that color is the best (single) color.
This article argues for a fundamentally different conception of the rules
governing litigation. I argue that the current set of procedural rules should be
treated as default rules, rather than as non-negotiable parameters. My thesis is
not that our rules of civil procedure do not work. The current system of
litigation may work well for some disputants, but the system is not ideally
designed for every disputant in every context. And the market indicators
available to us—for example, the rates at which disputants opt to pursue
traditional litigation through its completion—bear this out.2 If litigants
mutually want to change the shape of their litigation, as long as the
modifications do not disrupt the fundamental procedural criteria I describe
below, we ought to let them have their procedural way.
Consider litigants’ current experiences in the following scenarios.
Scenario One. Two businesses enter into a complex agreement to launch a joint
venture that will span dozens of states. They wisely anticipate the possibility
that a dispute may arise at some point regarding the implementation of the joint
venture, and they both would like to pre-identify the venue in which any future
disputes will be adjudicated. They also would prefer to specify ahead of time
the set of substantive laws that would be applied in adjudicating any future
dispute. And they mutually would prefer for any such dispute to be heard by a
1

HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 72 (Doubleday 1923).
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 459 (2004) (civil trial rate in federal
courts dropped from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002.).
2
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judge, rather than by a jury. Can these parties enter an agreement that would
provide the litigation experience they seek? Broadly speaking, yes.3
Scenario Two. A financial services firm files suit in federal district court
against a multinational corporation who was formerly a client. Both parties
express a strong interest in speeding the litigation along and would prefer to
have a magistrate judge hear the case because they fear that the district court’s
calendar may be unpredictable. The parties would prefer to use a mutuallyagreed-upon set of jury instructions that deviate somewhat from the pattern jury
instructions for their jurisdiction. They also want to enter a side-agreement that
has the effect of controlling the parameters of the eventual recovery, because
they fear the jury might return an extreme verdict on one side or the other. Can
these parties enter an agreement that would provide the litigation experience
they seek? Broadly speaking, yes.4
Scenario Three. Two former business partners are enmeshed in a bitter dispute
that already involves claims and counterclaims alleging breach of contract and
fraud. Both litigants fear that the costs and the scope of the litigation will spiral
out of control. They would like to enter a binding agreement that caps the scope
of the litigation, so that neither can engage in any further joinder. They would
like a guarantee that the court will enforce their mutually-established boundaries
on the scope of discovery. The litigants anticipate that some of the rules of
evidence will unnecessarily prolong the trial, so they mutually would prefer to
conduct the litigation under a more relaxed set of evidentiary standards. They
also want finality, and would like to limit, or even eliminate, the prospect of
post-judgment appeal. Can these litigants enter agreements that create the kind
of litigation experience they seek? No.
What prevents the litigants in the third scenario from customizing these and
many other aspects of litigation? The narrow answer is that these litigants
cannot customize because current procedures do not provide a specific
invitation to revise the aspects of litigation the litigants have identified as
problematic. The broader and more important answer, however, is that the
current rules of litigation are not broadly conceived of as a baseline. If this
assumption about customization were turned on its head—if the rules were
conceived of as defaults from which litigants could negotiate deviations—such
customization would be presumed legitimate. This article argues that the
assumption should be in favor of customization.
The idea of customized litigation offers at least three important benefits to
litigants and to society. First, it promotes justice. The literature on procedural
justice is staggeringly lengthy, but its fundamental lesson is fairly simple:
3

As I describe more fully in section III.A, infra, our current system enforces certain kinds of
contractual, pre-dispute customization agreements such as these.
4
As I describe more fully in section III.B., infra, current procedural rules permit a certain
measure of customization even after litigation has commenced.
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participants in a dispute resolution process think that procedure matters, and not
all procedures are alike in terms of making participants believe that justice has
been done. One of the most effective ways to increase a disputant’s satisfaction
with a dispute resolution process is to permit the disputant to have some say in
how the process will unfold. Second, customization offers the prospect of
greater efficiency within litigation. Rather than being confined to a generic
model of litigation, parties would have an opportunity to mold the procedures to
best fit the contours of their particular dispute, minimizing unnecessary
expenditures. Finally, increased opportunities for customized litigation may
“save” society from the much-publicized demise of the civil trial. The
overwhelming modern trend is away from litigation as the primary means of
resolving disputes. Many scholars and observers debate whether this trend is
positive or negative, on the whole. But virtually all acknowledge that courts
play a vital role in promoting the rule of law—a role that would be threatened if
civil cases cease to proceed through public litigation. More disputants might
opt to take their cases to court if courts offered more of the flexibility that is
currently offered in processes outside of litigation.
Customization has its limits. I articulate three criteria for sorting that which is
truly essential to litigation from that which disputants ought to be able to
negotiate themselves.5 The first is the most mundane: Does the proposed
procedural variation violate the Constitution or the statutes that create the court
overseeing the litigation? Clearly, for example, the parties cannot—even with
consent—create subject matter jurisdiction in a court that otherwise has none.
Second, does the rule affect the public’s interests in the litigation? For example,
because some rules are designed to foster efficiency, we would reasonably not
want to permit private litigants to construct publicly-subsidized litigation in a
way that wastes public resources. Third, does the rule affect non-participants in
the litigation? For example, we would want to guard against a circumstance in
which a customized rule would affect or bind anyone (for example, through the
preclusion doctrines) who did not agree to the customized rule.
This article argues for a radical expansion of litigants’ customization options,
and the prospect of such an expansion raises important questions. Would the
transaction costs inherent to the process of customization be so onerous that
litigants would see no benefit? Would customized procedures confuse or
overwhelm the judiciary? Would customization become a tool of the powerful
to strip trials of procedural devices aimed at protecting the weak? Should the
judiciary concern itself with offering customized litigation, given the widespread availability of private arbitration? In the final section of this article, I
acknowledge and address the most pressing fears, questions, and complications
arising from the prospect of customized litigation. I argue that the risks and
uncertainties involved with the customization experiment would be manageable
and that its enormous potential benefits make customization imperative for the
future of litigation.
5

For more on the limits of legitimate customization, see Section IV, infra.
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Ford would fare poorly in the crowded marketplace today if it persisted in
offering customers only one color of automobile. With the meteoric rise of both
mediation and arbitration, the marketplace for dispute resolution processes is
also increasingly crowded. The time has come for our courts to offer
prospective litigants more choices.
I. OPPORTUNITIES TO CUSTOMIZE LITIGATION
Mechanisms by which disputants arrive at resolution have almost limitless
variations. Even within the narrow category of dispute resolution mechanisms
referred to as litigation, one sees tremendous potential variation on a range of
different questions. Virtually every topic in an introductory Civil Procedure
course describes some aspect of litigation that our system of justice handles one
way, but which one could imagine being handled in some other way by some
other court system. How is an action commenced? Who sets the scope of the
dispute, and how? In what forum must the litigation take place? What evidence
is considered, and how is it gathered? On what basis are decisions made? Who
makes the decisions? What effect does a decision have on the litigants? What
effect does a decision have on non-litigants? And so on.6
Each of these questions has one or more answers in our court systems, but a
Civil Procedure course must spend time exploring them precisely because the
answers are not self-evident.7 We have a system for joinder, for discovery, for
dispositive motions, for evidence, for appeals, and for dozens of other issues
critical to the functioning of our litigation system. We have designed each of
these sub-systems in the best way we can currently think to design them. Each
looks different now than it did in some previous version of our court system,8
and each looks different from the system in place in some other country’s court
system. No one would imagine that our current version of the rules of litigation
have now, finally, reached a state of immutable perfection. Virtually every
year, we make some revisions to the procedures in place in federal courts, and a
6
For an overview of the relationship between the procedural components of litigation and
other mechanisms of dispute resolution, see Jeffrey R. Seul, Litigation as a Dispute
Resolution Alternative, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13-31 (Michael L. Moffitt
& Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
7
Virtually the entire body of literature falling under the umbrella label “comparative civil
procedure” serves as an illustration of this point. In the global community, one sees
variations on virtually every aspect of procedure. See generally ARTHUR VON MEHREN, LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES: A GENERAL COMPARATIVE VIEW (1992); JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER &
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD (2002); MIRJAN
DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO
THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986); MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1989).
8
Cf. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1030 (1984) (describing procedural
development as “a series of attempts to solve the problems created by the preceding
generation’s procedural reforms.”).
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similar pattern exists in the states.9 We will continue to amend the rules of
adjudication as we learn more about what methods best address our shared
interests in the judicial system.
What would it look like to permit litigants to customize the rules of litigation?
Below, I describe the possibility of customization in four different aspects of
litigation procedure. These are illustrative only. Though I describe what the
customized rules might contain, I do not intend to suggest that these are the
precise variations that litigants would necessarily prefer. And I certainly do not
suggest that these are the only categories of variations one could imagine
litigants preferring. My purpose in describing them is to help give shape to the
concept of customized litigation. I have chosen these potentially provocative
examples, in part, because they help to illustrate customization’s opportunities
and outer boundaries.
A. Joinder
Certain litigants might reasonably prefer to have a different set of rules
regarding the scope of their litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and virtually every state procedural system present the opportunity for liberal
joinder of both claims and parties. One can imagine circumstances in which the
parties might mutually fear a joinder arms race—a piece of litigation that
explodes into a mess of parties and claims. In some cases, permissive joinder
resembles a prisoner’s dilemma, with the act of joining a claim or a party
roughly resembling “defection” in the well-known game theoretic construct.10
One way out of a prisoner’s dilemma, of course, is to create a mechanism for
public, mutual, binding commitments, so that neither side is able to defect nor
fears defection from the other side. What if litigants wanted to preclude
permissive joinder by “freezing” the scope of a piece of litigation at some very
early point in time?
The current rules provide no reliable mechanism for parties to assure
themselves early on that the scope of litigation has been (and will remain)
contained. Indeed, in modern litigation, parties routinely change the scope of
their claims or defenses. Rule 15 routinely permits formal amendment even
well after the commencement of the litigation, indicating that “leave [to amend]
shall be freely given when justice so requires.”11 Under the “relation back”
doctrine, added claims or defenses may even be treated as if they were part of
9

See Carl Tobias, The Past the Future of the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 400,
403 (2002).
10
For an interesting application of the prisoner’s dilemma to basic civil litigation, see Orley
Ashenfelter & David Bloom, Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
(Working Paper No. 270, Princeton Univ. Indus. Rel. Sec. 1990) (concluding that the
decision to hire a lawyer constitutes a “defection” in prisoner’s dilemma terms, because
outcomes produced by two unrepresented parties are statistically indistinguishable from those
in which both parties had lawyers, except for the attorneys’ fees).
11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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the original pleadings, so that even the statute of limitations does not act as a
complete bar.12 In fact, even at trial, the rules contemplate that issues that were
never previously raised will still be treated as if they had been in issue all along,
unless the opposing party objects. Even if an opposing party objects, however,
the court will permit the new issue or evidence to be introduced, unless the
objecting party can demonstrate “prejudice.”13
One can imagine why litigants might want courts to enforce a mutual agreement
not to file amended pleadings or to bring about permissive joinder in any other
way. One litigator I interviewed in connection with my research for this article
indicated that if a reliable mechanism along these lines existed, he could
envision “some cases when I would include a proposed, customized joinderlimitation in my demand letter to the other side,” before the litigation even
began.14
The strongest objection to the enforcement of such a customized procedural
arrangement likely stems from the efficiency argument underlying modern
procedure’s liberal joinder policy. One of the strongest motivators for requiring
joinder along transactional lines is the assumption (most likely correct) that it is
wasteful to permit litigants to bring multiple lawsuits over the same transaction
or occurrence. The Federal Rules and most state procedural systems, therefore,
provide for compulsory counterclaims and have res judicata doctrines that
functionally require litigants to raise all claims related to a single transaction in
one lawsuit. As to compulsory joinder, therefore, the efficiency rationale is
compelling.
Customization limiting permissive joinder, however, raises a different set of
issues. If the plaintiff has five completely unrelated claims against the same
defendant, how much more efficient is it to permit all of the claims to be joined
together in one lawsuit?15 The fact that courts commonly wind up holding
separate trials in these cases suggests that the opportunities for efficiency are
more limited than with compulsory joinder.16 Furthermore, by their very nature,
opportunities for permissive joinder are just that—permissive. We do not
require litigants to bring unrelated claims together; we merely invite them to do
so. To the extent that they have created a customized procedure in which they
have agreed not to do so, why not enforce that agreement?
Some litigants might prefer the wholesale rejection of further joinder I describe
in this section. Others might prefer simply to confine joinder in a more modest,
pre-determined manner. And it is easy to imagine that one or both of the parties
12

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
14
Interview with Robert Tsai (January 2006).
15
I suspect that one of the bases for suggesting that permissive joinder is more efficient has
to do with the likelihood of settlement. In other words, perhaps it is more efficient to settle
five cases all at once, rather than separately.
16
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
13
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in some circumstances might prefer the rules of joinder just as they are. That is
the beauty of customization—it would permit litigants to tailor the rules in ways
they consider to be mutually advantageous, when such an opportunity arises.
B. Discovery
Many discovery-related circumstances are already fully within the parties’
control.17 Yet more room for customization exists, particularly regarding the
circumstances in which a court will overturn litigants’ private agreements
regarding discovery. What if litigants wanted to limit the circumstances in
which courts would intervene in the litigants’ decisions about how discovery
should unfold?
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 provides an example of the kind of judicial
intervention contemplated by modern discovery rules. It provides that litigants’
agreements with respect to discovery timing are subject to “the approval of the
court,” if the customization would disrupt a previously adopted calendar or
timetable.18 In the modern era of “managerial” judges, the policy can be
understood as an effort to curtail indefinite litigation. Once a modern judge
establishes a deadline for dispositive motions, for discovery closure, or for trial,
receiving an extension of time becomes quite difficult. If one envisions courts’
dockets as being cluttered with perpetually-neglected cases, then the opposition
to extensions is sensible.
In at least some circumstances, however, cases linger on the docket because of
haste, rather than the opposite. One litigator I interviewed called this trend
toward judges rejecting joint motions to extend discovery deadlines, “the worst,
most inefficient, single most annoying thing judges do these days.”19 Many of
the procedural hurdles over which litigants must leap are aimed at preparation
for adjudication, rather than at facilitating settlement.20 Sometimes, the way to
get a case off the docket (if that is the concern driving the tight deadlines) is to
give the disputants more time to find non-adjudicative resolutions. In such
circumstances, why not permit litigants to customize the calendar? If they both
agree that more time would help, why not let them have it? Nothing in the
statutory or constitutional structures underlying the courts demands discovery of
17

For a description of the circumstances in which litigants already customize some aspects of
discovery practice, see section III.B.3., infra.
18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(2).
19
Interview with Jeffrey Krivis in Los Angeles, California (February 2006). I acknowledge
the possibility that judges engage in managerial decisions that are simultaneously important
and unpopular with the targeted litigants. Courts’ dockets cannot be held hostage by litigants
who protract litigation through mutual neglect, sloth, or inattention. That some litigants
believe judges erred in their exercise of discretion on timing is not evidence that the judges in
fact erred. It is evidence, however, that some litigants hold the perception that they would be
better served by a different treatment of litigation calendars.
20
See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note ___ (arguing that the timing and structure of modern pleading
rules complicate, rather than facilitate, efficient settlement discussions).
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a particular shape or timing. Mutually-acceptable extensions would not create
any meaningful burden on non-litigants, nor would they affect the symbolic or
functional public interests associated with the judiciary. If the real concern is
the integrity of the court’s docket, perhaps we could allow them to post some
“bond” of sorts, so that if the extra time does not produce settlement, some other
trigger (financial or time-related) kicks in. In all events, more room exists for
litigants to explore mutual customization of discovery devices and deadlines.
A second example of potential customization stems from the prospect that some
litigants will have precisely the opposite interests of those described above.
Some litigants do not want extensions of time. They do not want the court to
grant extra interrogatories or extra depositions. Instead, they want true security
that discovery will not run amok. If both sides prefer a tight discovery
schedule, of course, they are free to craft one under Rule 26(f) and have the
judge enter their mutual request as an order pursuant to Rule 16. For many
litigants, this may be sufficient assurance that the discovery will be as quick and
as streamlined as they initially negotiated. The problem, however, lies in the
prospect that the trial court may (as many do) subsequently grant a motion by
one litigant to permit discovery beyond that which was mutually negotiated at
the outset. “For good cause,” a court may alter the provisions of a scheduling
order, and the non-moving party would face almost impossible odds in having
the trial court’s decision to extend or expand discovery reversed on appeal.21
What if the litigants mutually wanted a more binding commitment at the outset
of discovery? In Homer’s Odyssey, Ulysees so feared that he would be lured by
the seductive and disastrous call of the sirens that he instructed his sailors to
lash him to the masts (so that he could not turn the boat) and to fill their own
ears with wax (so that they would not heed his subsequent requests to take the
boat in that direction). What if litigants wanted to enter an Odyssean
commitment regarding discovery at the outset of litigation?22
Discovery represents such a significant component of modern litigation
expenses that one can easily imagine why litigants might want a reliable
mechanism for limiting its use.23 A firm-and-durable ceiling on the availability
21
See Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 954 (4th Cir. 1984) (scheduling orders "are
not set in stone, but may be relaxed for good cause, extraordinary circumstances, or in the
interest of justice"); O’Connell v. Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico, 357 F.3d 152, 155 (D.P.R.
2004) (contrasting the “good cause” standard of discovery schedule revisions with the “freely
given” standards of pleading amendment).
22
The idea that one might reasonably seek to preclude certain options that would otherwise
be available is well-established. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 168 (2000); ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE
SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36 (1984).
23
For more on discovery costs, see John D. Shugrue, Identifying and Combating Discovery
Abuse, 23 LITIG. 2 (1997); Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard, Dean
Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal
Rule Amendments, 39 B.C.L. REV. 525 (1998); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL
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of discovery would be troublesome if it were imposed on litigants, but most of
those concerns evaporate if both parties are sophisticated and knowingly entered
the agreement at the outset of the litigation.
Nothing about enforcing such a customized rule would create inefficient
expenditures of public resources. Indeed, it would likely curtail costly
discovery disputes. Indeed, except for the relatively rare discovery dispute that
actually winds up before the court, most of the expenses involved in discovery
practice are borne solely by the litigants as private expenses. When the scope of
discovery explodes beyond control, it is not the courts who are burdened, it is
the litigants and their checkbooks. Efficiency concerns, therefore, present no
legitimate barrier to this form of customization.
In different circumstances, litigants might reasonably want different kinds of
discovery systems. In some, litigants might think the current system operates
just fine. In others, the litigants might want to expand (or curtail) the
circumstances in which the court would intervene and disrupt the litigants’
discovery plans. Discovery practice presents a clear opportunity for litigants to
customize their litigation experience, provided they can assure themselves that
the court will support their customization decisions.
C. Evidence
Modern rules of evidence depend heavily on the incentives of adversarial
adjudication. In a crass vision of litigation, each side may try to “get away
with” introducing evidence that arguably (or even certainly) does not conform
to the standards set forth in the Rules of Evidence. Curtailing this behavior is
the ability of the other side to raise an objection to the court, inviting the court
to decide on whether the proposed evidence is admissible. As a result, in some
cases, litigants must spend considerable time laying foundation for certain
testimony, fighting about the admissibility of other evidence, and so on. For
centuries, many have viewed this adversarial clash as the most reliable and
efficient mechanism for discerning the truth. It is worth highlighting that this is
a process largely driven by the parties. The court’s role is fundamentally
passive—it typically waits for the opposing litigant to object before ruling on
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence or testimony. Absent an
objection, therefore, evidence that might not have survived a challenge almost
certainly gets in front of the jury.
What if litigants wanted mutually to present evidence in a manner that deviated
from the norms established by the Federal Rules of Evidence? One attorney I
interviewed in connection with this article described a case in which he and
opposing counsel discussed the question of evidentiary rules in advance of the
litigation. The case involved a contest over the valuation of a particular piece of
JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY
CHANGE (1997).
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property in an eminent domain case. Each planned to put an expert on the stand
to testify as to certain aspects of the property’s value, but each expert’s
testimony would have considerable components that would be nothing more
than hearsay. The lawyer and his counterpart agreed ex ante that neither would
object on the basis of hearsay when either expert was on the stand. The two
mutually approached the bench and informed the judge of their private
arrangement, and the judge did nothing to stand in the way of the arrangement.
In the words of one, “What would have otherwise taken days took no more than
a couple of hours of trial time.”24 Litigants may have reason to want to
customize the rules of evidence.
One trend supporting the view that litigants might mutually disfavor the rules of
evidence can be seen in modern arbitration. Arbitrators may (or may not) apply
the rules of evidence in adversarial arbitration hearings, depending on the
contractual terms negotiated by the disputants themselves. This feature of
arbitration is commonly cited as a comparative advantage. One attorney I
interviewed explained his preference for arbitration’s customized evidentiary
standards by saying, “The rules of evidence don’t actually keep anything from
getting in; they just make it take longer to get it in.”25
Should the court system permit such customization? In the eminent domain
case described above, the litigation proceeded on the basis of a mutual
understanding. Both sides agreed not to object on the basis of hearsay, and
neither did. But what if one side had objected in open trial? Should the court
have enforced the prior agreement? In all likelihood, the customization
agreement would not have withstood an attack on public policy grounds. The
agreement would likely have been considered void and unenforceable. I am not
convinced that should be the result.
Mutually crafted adaptations of the rules of evidence would not change the
courts or their functions in any intolerable way. Courts have not engaged in
unconstitutional behavior if they permit objectionable-but-unobjected-to
evidence to go before a jury. Nothing in a revised set of evidentiary rules would
prevent a court from serving the important functions of resolving disputes or
articulating the laws relevant to that dispute.26 Efficiency concerns do not stand
in the way of customization, because if anything, adjudicative proceedings with

24

Interview with Maurice Holland in Eugene, Oregon. (October 2005).
Interview with M. J. Tedesco in Cambridge, Massachusetts (June 2004). In at least one
respect, this may overstate the case because one might expect a legally-trained arbitrator to
handle hearsay (or some other unreliable form of evidence) differently than a lay jury. We
might have greater confidence in an “open-season” approach to evidence in arbitration (or in
a bench trial) than in a civil jury trial.
26
A court’s interpretation of substantive laws relevant to a case would not be affected. The
only aspect of law-articulation that would be curtailed would be the laws of evidence, since
those would not be the focus of the litigation.
25
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customized evidentiary standards would likely proceed more quickly.
Customized litigation holds no prospect of harming non-litigants.27
Perhaps the best argument against permitting customized evidentiary standards
stems from the public’s symbolic interests in the functioning of the courts. In
short, might it sully the public’s good image of the courts if the public somehow
found out that the court was permitting hearsay to go before a jury in a given
case? I think not, for two reasons. First, I doubt seriously that most casual
observers of the court system would be capable of discerning hearsay from
permissible testimony.28 Second, it is not clear to me why it would make the
court look bad, since it was based on the affirmative agreement of the litigants.
The public may have a diminished view of one of the litigants—the one
ultimately harmed by the agreement not to have the same evidentiary
standards—but that does not argue against permitting the customization.
As with the other aspects of litigation I have described in this section, it is easy
to imagine litigants crafting a great number of possible variations on the rules of
evidence. Some might dispense with them broadly, and some might carve out
only narrow deviations from the current rules.29 And surely some would prefer
to proceed through litigation applying the existing rules. If evidentiary
standards were treated as default rules, each of these litigants would have its
way.
D. Appeals
Appeals present a fourth illustrative example of an area of litigation in which
litigants might conceivably seek to customize their experience. For evidence
that litigants might place value on the ability to limit, ex ante, their subsequent
opportunities for appeal, one need look no further than modern trends in
arbitration. Though arbitration proponents proclaim its virtues on many
different levels,30 most of the distinctions between arbitration and litigation are
27

Even the common law preclusion doctrines are structured in a way that would largely
accommodate customized litigation. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides that
collateral estoppel does not attach in cases in which “A new determination of the issue is
warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two
courts.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS §28 (c)(3).
28
In fact, if we were confident that jurors were consistently able to sort reliable forms of
evidence from unreliable forms of evidence, were unaffected by prejudicial materials, etc.,
then we would have little need for the Rules of Evidence at all. The Rules’ function, keeping
certain forms of evidence from being submitted to a jury, presumes that jurors cannot be
trusted to do that sorting on their own.
29
For example, I can imagine a scenario in which litigants each wanted to present medical
testimony from an expert witness solely in the form of competing affidavits. Customizable
evidentiary standards would permit them to proceed according to their preference.
30
Among the frequently claimed advantages are speed, informality, expertise of the decision
maker, and cost-effectiveness. The evidence is mixed regarding at least some of these
claims. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at 13 (1982) ("The advantages of arbitration are
many: it is usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and
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lost on the average (or even the sophisticated) arbitration consumer. The one
thing they are quick to point to, however, is the finality arbitration offers,
because of the extraordinarily limited opportunities for judicial review of
arbitral awards.31 What if litigants wanted similar assurances about the finality
of a judgment entered by a trial court?
Our court system makes appellate review available to litigants for a number of
reasons. We have an interest in assuring that the litigated outcome was the
“correct” one, by the relevant legal standards.32 We have an interest in making
litigants believe that justice has been done. We want trial courts to operate
within the rules of the law, and we assume that the prospect of subsequent
appellate review encourages trial court judges to behave appropriately. And we
value appellate courts’ ability to make pronouncements of law that will be both
publicly educative and binding on a broader set of courts.
Despite these societal interests, however, we leave the matter of appeals entirely
in the hands of individual litigants. We do not require appellate courts to
review every lower court decision. Indeed, appellate courts are essentially
passive bodies, sitting idly until a litigant with appropriate standing invites them
into a dispute. The typical litigant’s decision to seek review by an appellate
court is made after the conclusion of the trial court’s work. We permit litigants
to bargain over whether they will exercise this right. Indeed, we often
encourage them not to pursue appeals, through things like appellate mediation
programs.33 There is nothing remarkable about the idea that a losing litigant
might not raise an appeal.
Pre-litigation customization that reduces or eliminates the prospect of appeal
would merely change the timing of the decision whether or not to appeal. Why
not allow litigants pre-commit to waive their rights to appeal? Why not allow
them to enter litigation knowing that the outcome in trial court would be final?
evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future
business dealings among the parties; it is often more flexible in regard to scheduling of times
and places of hearings and discovery devices . . . ."), cited in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31
(1991) (citing arbitration’s simplicity, informality, and expedition); Jennifer Johnson, Wall
Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Litigation, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 123 (2005) (naming “expertise of the arbitrators” as a primary advantage over litigation,
but suggesting that in the securities arbitration context, such expertise may be overstated).
31
See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (describing limited circumstances under
which judicial review of arbitral awards is possible).
32
Our system assumes that an appellate court, with its ability to focus more narrowly on each
legal decision by the trial court, will render a more accurate decision than the previous
decision. At some level, of course, Robert Jackson’s observation “We [the Supreme Court]
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final” holds
true. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
33
See Gilbert J. Ginsburg, Essay: The Case for a Mediation Program in the Federal Court,
50 AM. U.L. REV. 1379, 1382-90 (2001) (surveying existing federal appellate court mediation
programs).
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Appellate customization would not run afoul of the constitutional or statutory
foundations of the courts. Civil litigants have no constitutional right to appeal,
though virtually all court systems provide at least one opportunity for appeal as
of right. Nevertheless, we routinely let litigants waive or bargain away this
right. Binding litigation, without the prospect for appeal, would not cause trial
courts to exceed their constitutional or statutory authority. The trial court would
merely oversee the litigation as usual. I can imagine that litigants might agree
not to disclose the no-appeals customization to the trial court, so that the trial
court would continue to operate as if appellate review were an option. In
function, however, customization of litigation would not disrupt the operation of
the trial courts in any objectionable manner. One might object that such
agreements would strip appellate courts of their jurisdiction,34 but again,
appellate courts’ jurisdiction relies on parties bringing a case before them. A
private customization agreement would not divest courts of their jurisdiction.
Instead, it would act as a waiver of the right to appear before that court.
The most potentially troublesome aspect of the prospect of customization of
appeals may stem from its effects on the public’s interest in hearing appellate
courts’ pronouncements on the law. Might a limit on appeals result in an
inadequate flow of appellate decisions, and thus contribute to an underdeveloped body of law? At some level, this is an empirical question to which
no ready answer is available. Taken to an absurd extreme, of course, the public
would surely object if the river of Supreme Court petitions for certiorari dried
up because of customization upstream. On the other hand, no recent visitor to a
law school library’s stacks could credibly assert that we are suffering from a
dearth of appellate opinions.35
Permitting customization of appeals, like all forms of customization, would be
no more than a mutual choice by the litigants in a particular dispute. From the
Rawlsian position, behind the veil of ignorance, before the litigation begins,
neither party necessarily has reason to believe that its side will be the one to
suffer from some judicial malfeasance. Imagine that the plaintiff and defendant
each gaze into their respective crystal balls, and that each determines that it is
equally likely to benefit from as to suffer from some appealable trial court error.
34

In some ways, such an argument would parallel some of the arguments made in opposition
to enforcing arbitration agreements in earlier times. Arbitration was said to strip courts,
impermissibly, of their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd , 470 U.S.
213, 220 n.6 (1985) (citing reference in the legislative history of the FAA to some courts’
historical refusal to enforce arbitration agreements on the ground that they “ousted” courts of
jurisdiction); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 270-71 (tracing historical development
to English courts’ hostile relationship to arbitration on the grounds of jurisdictional
interference) (1995).
35
Cf. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L. J. 2619,
2644 (1995) (suggesting that continued increases in litigation rates and opinion generation
risks creating “babel, with thousands of decisions issued weekly and no one judge capable of
comprehending the entire corpus of federal law”).
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In that case, at that moment in time, the prospect of appeals appear as nothing
more than a transaction cost, because the appellate decision would do nothing
more than redistribute (at a cost) the endowments the trial court bestowed on the
parties. We would not blink an eye at the prospect of litigants settling a case
following the entry of judgment, before appeals occur. Indeed, we spend some
public resources trying to encourage them to do precisely that. Why not allow
these parties to agree, before litigation, that the trial court’s decisions will be
final? Subject to the constraints articulated in Section ___, we should permit
such customization.
Some litigants would be too nervous to foreclose all opportunities for appeal.
They might prefer, for example, to curtail only one category of appeals. Still
other litigants—for example those whose interests are in legal reform—would
likely resist any effort to restrict access to appellate courts. Each of these
options should be available to litigants.
My purpose in this section is not to suggest a particular structure for
customizing appeals or any other procedural process. What would customized
litigation look like? In short, it would look however the litigants wanted it to
look.36
II. THE CASE FOR PERMITTING BROAD CUSTOMIZATION
Increasing litigants’ opportunities for customization would improve the civil
justice system in at least three ways. First, customized litigation holds the
promise of outcomes that are more just—and more recognized as just—than the
current system. Second, treating modern procedural rules as defaults from
which parties can mutually negotiate deviations holds the promise of more
efficient expenditures of both private and public resources. The third part of my
argument for changing the litigation structure stems from the rapid decline in
rates with which disputants use jury trials to resolve disputes. Although I do not
ascribe to the overly-romanticized vision some paint of the jury trial system,37 I
believe that juries play a critical function in our democratic system of justice.38
36

In Section IV, below, I describe the parameters of customization. Litigants’ options are not
as boundless as this phrase might suggest.
37
I first encountered the term “litigation romanticism” in the writings of Carrie MenkelMeadow. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway? A Philosophical
and Democratic Defense of Settlement, 83 GEO. L. J. 2663, 2669 (1995) (hereinafter Whose
Dispute is it?); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual
Founder of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From
Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute
Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL ED. 7, 22 (2005); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Narrowing The Gap By Narrowing The Field: What's Missing From The Maccrate
Report--Of Skills, Legal Science And Being A Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593 (1994).
See also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES, 689 (Nov. 2004).
38
See section ___, infra.
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Customized litigation would help to preserve and promote those aspects of the
modern jury system that are most important. The time has come for litigants to
have more choices about how their litigation unfolds.
A. Customization Supports Procedural Justice
A substantial body of research, spanning several decades, demonstrates that
disputants care not only about the outcomes they receive, but also about the
process(es) that led to the outcome of their dispute.39 This literature, which falls
under the broad umbrella of “procedural justice,” suggests that disputants
commonly prefer certain alternatives to litigation, for example, even if those
alternatives do not produce more favorable substantive outcomes than
litigation.40 Most research suggests that the distributive outcomes—who got
how much—have only a modest effect on how disputants perceive the fairness
of the procedures they went through. In fact, important causal effects seem to
run in the opposite direction. “Disputants’ perception of the justice provided by
a procedure affect their judgments of the distributive justice provided by the
outcome.”41
The lessons of procedural justice research have important implications for the
prospect of customized litigation.
Evidence suggests that disputants
consistently value certain features in a dispute resolution mechanism. For
example, they want “voice”—an opportunity to tell their stories.42 Disputants
also want fair decision makers and a process that treats each disputant with
dignity and respect.43 These factors each speak to a feature of a particular
process. Another aspect of procedural justice—another variable in assessing
whether disputants view an outcome as fair—is the degree to which the
disputants had control over the process itself.44 Providing disputants with
process control increases the disputants’ perceptions of justice. Customized
litigation is a form of process control, suggesting the prospect of increasing
procedural justice.

39

For a survey of this literature, see E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 2 (1998) (“[D]issatisfaction [in the face of a favorable
outcome in a social situation] is difficult to understand if it is assumed that people are
concerned only about outcomes but is often easily explained if it is assumed that people are
concerned about process.”)
40
See Tom R. Tyler. Citizen Discontent With Legal Procedures. 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871,
881-883 (1997) (describing research in which fathers in child custody disputes preferred
mediation over litigation—even though they received no better substantive outcomes in
mediation).
41
Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do
With It?, 79 WASH. L.Q. 787, 817 (2001).
42
See id.
43
See id; LIND & TYLER, supra note ___, at 214.
44
See LIND & TYLER, , supra note __, at 94 (1988) (“One of the central themes of Thibaut
and Walker is that procedures that provide high process control for disputants tend to enhance
procedural fairness. More recent research has confirmed this general finding.”).
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We cannot reasonably expect all forms of customization to affect procedural
justice and perceptions of fairness equally. At least two factors could serve to
dampen the potential benefits of customization. First, in the litigation context,
most of a disputant’s activity is conducted through an attorney. The distinction
between an agent and a principle almost certainly matters, for purposes of
gauging potential benefits from procedural justice. There is a limit on how
much procedural justice “trickles down” to those who occupy a less prominent
role. A procedure that gives a litigant’s attorney “voice” surely provides more
procedural justice than one that fails to provide the attorney with voice. One
would expect, however, that the fact that the procedural benefit is focused on
the attorney, rather than on the litigant, would dampen the potential benefits.45
If customization occurs, therefore, merely as the product of behind-the-scenes
negotiations between opposing counsel, the procedural justice argument is
weakened. The process control aspects of procedural justice are strongest when
the principle is the party exercising control over the process.
A second limit on the capacity of litigation customization to deliver procedural
justice depends on the timing of the customization. Modern forms of so-called
“mandatory” arbitration provide the cautionary tale that illustrating this point.46
The original picture of arbitration—two disputants mutually agreeing to submit
an existing dispute to an arbitrator of their choice, applying a mutually
negotiated set of arbitral procedures—raises few significant concerns. In the
past two decades, however, the tide has shifted dramatically toward enforcing
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Today, it is difficult to purchase a consumer
good, accept employment, or receive health care treatment without having been
deemed to have consented to a form of arbitration, thereby waiving any right to
a trial.47 Whatever procedural justice claim arbitration might have had is
undermined both by the adhesion manner in which they are commonly imposed

45

See, e.g., Welsh supra note ___, at 838 (arguing that excluding parties from mediation, as a
cost-saving mechanism, decreases perceptions of procedural justice); Donna Shestowsky,
Procedural Preference in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 10 PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND LAW 240 (2004) (“[Participants] preferred a process that granted disputants direct control
over the presentation of evidence (rather than allowing a representative to do so).”)
46
See, e.g., Jean Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration. 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) (“[A]lthough theoretically
the arbitration is not mandatory, effectively the consumer/employee has no choice but to
sacrifice her right to a fair day in court if she wants the job, service or product in question.”);
Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics—Is California the Future?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
343, 359 (2003) (“[Mandatory arbitration’ clauses effectively restrict access to courts and
attempt to limit class actions on behalf of claimants, who are unlikely in great numbers to
pursue individual arbitration proceedings or obtain lawyers to challenge arbitration clauses.”)
47
See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration. 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 637 (1996). (“Large companies
such as banks, hospitals, brokerage houses and even pest exterminators are increasingly
including mandatory binding arbitration clauses in the fine print contracts they require all
customers, employees, franchisees and other little guys to sign.”)
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on one party and by the temporal distance between the agreement and its
implementation. Broad, anticipatory customization is not what I envision.48
Perceptions of justice stand to improve, however, if litigation customization
provides a role for the actual disputants and is conducted in the context of a
specific piece of litigation. And perceptions of justice are important. As I
describe in section ___ below, we ask our courts to play a range of different
functions, including clarifying and publicizing laws, resolving disputes, and
articulating collective norms. Courts’ ability effectively to perform these
functions depends, in large measure, on their ability to occupy a place of
legitimacy in the public mind. If courts are, in fact, acting in a legitimate
manner, then it is in the interest of democratic governance that the public
perceive the courts to be legitimate. Disputants’ assessments of procedural
justice influence “their compliance with the outcome and their faith in the
legitimacy of the institution that offered the procedure.”49 Assuring the
presence of procedural justice is critical to the judiciary’s basic functions, and
permitting litigants say in the design of the litigation system holds promise for
increasing perceptions of procedural justice.
B. Customization Promotes Efficiency
In recent years, many have proposed to change the civil litigation system, citing
the need to improve its efficiency. Calls for reform have been broad and loud.
For example, in 2005, Robert J. Grey, then President of the American Bar
Association wrote, “The opportunity to modernize, streamline and provide a
more efficient process for resolving disputes can only produce positive results
for society and the profession. There are no losers, only winners, in this
effort.”50 One proposal calls for greater use of timed trials, with each side’s
allocated time ticking down every time it stands to speak or present a witness.51
Other proposals are aimed at limiting discovery expenses, at streamlining the
jury selection process, or at improving juror comprehension.52 Many of these
ideas have merit and would probably improve the overall efficiency of the
litigation system. However, they all still assume a single, immutable set of
procedures for all disputes.

48

For more on the relationship between arbitration and customized litigation, see section ___,
infra.
49
Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do
With It?, 79 WASH. L.Q. 787, 817 (2001).
50
Robert J. Grey, Striving for a Just Solution: Our Work to Improve the Dispute Resolution
System Benefits Society and the Profession ABA Journal, 91 A.B.A.J. 6 (July 2005).
51
For a discussion of the legal and practice implications of timed trials, see Martha K.
Gooding & Ryan E. Lindsey, Tempus Fugit: Practical Considerations For Trying A Case
Against the Clock, 53 FED. LAW. 42, 45 (2006).
52
See American Bar Association, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials 21 (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf.
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Customization offers the prospect of increasing litigation’s efficiency,
regardless of the fate of the current set of reform efforts. Whether
customization would, in fact, lead to more efficient expenditures by disputants
is an empirical question for which we currently have no data. We can
anticipate, however, the conditions that would have to exist for customization to
produce efficiencies. (1) The court system’s caseload would have to include
different kinds of disputes or disputants—some reason why one pair of litigants
might have preferences different from another pair of litigants. (2) The current
court system would have to impose the same general rules on all litigants. (3)
Some pairs of litigants would mutually have to prefer some other set of
procedural rules, in at least some circumstances. And (4) the costs of
customizing those rules would have to be less than the costs created by applying
the default rules.
The first two conditions clearly exist in the current system. Most courts see a
great variety of disputes and disputants. The same federal district court will
hear a discrimination claim, a complaint about a hazardous waste cleanup, a
patent infringement action, a breach of contract claim between multinational
corporations, and a voter rights complaint. The same federal district court will
hear cases brought by pro se litigants, by sole practitioners representing litigants
of modest means, and by corporate counsel for multinational corporations. And
under the current system, it will apply identical procedures to each lawsuit.53
As I described in Section ___ above, we also have reason to believe that some
disputants might sometimes mutually prefer a set of procedural rules that
deviate from the current rules—often for reasons related to efficiency. For
example, some litigants might mutually want to dispense entirely with the
possibility of any appeals, because of the cost and delay they entail. Others
might prefer to remove choice from some later stage in the litigation process by
entering a Ulysses-like commitment up front. Parties might prefer to have a
hard cap on discovery, a limit on joinder, or even a restriction against raising
certain evidentiary objections—all in the name of efficiency. Whatever degree
of admiration is due to the drafters of the civil procedure rules—and I
personally think we owe them very considerable admiration—even they would
not claim that current procedures are all things for all disputes. Instead, the
current rules represent our best guess at the procedures that will produce the
best justice, the best way, for the most cases. We can expect no more of a
single set of procedural rules. It stands to reason that litigants might sometimes
mutually prefer some other variation on the rules.

53
In specialized courts, one might credibly argue that these procedures have been tailored to
meet the particular dynamics and incentives of that kind of dispute. Perhaps traffic courts
have perfectly efficient procedures for processing traffic tickets. Perhaps domestic relations
courts have procedures that waste no resources in the adjudication of parental rights claims.
Most courts, however, hear a broad array of different cases.
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The efficiency question, therefore, boils down to a matter of comparative costs.
Would the cost of customization ever be less than the cost of applying the
general rules to a dispute in which both litigants would prefer a customized
rule?
If all of the relevant costs were borne uniquely by the litigants themselves,54 the
equation would be simple, involving only three variables.
C = the litigants’ anticipated costs operating under the current, general rule.
C = the litigants’ anticipated costs operating under their customized rule.
N = the costs of discovering a potentially mutually preferred procedural
rule and negotiating its terms.
In mathematical terms, customization would produce attractive efficiencies for
the litigants if C > C + N.
The transaction costs involved in the search for potential efficiency may, in
certain contexts, outweigh the potential benefits that might derive from
customization. I would not expect, therefore, that we would see sweeping
customization agreements in small claims courts, for example. The dollars at
stake and the marginal efficiencies the parties might realize through some
adjusted procedure would not justify the expenditures involved in crafting the
customized rules.
We should not, however, overestimate the potential costs involved in searching
for customization agreements. First, the existence of the underlying, default
procedural rules provides considerable protection against wasteful investment in
the search for agreement. Because either side can pull the plug at any time
during the exploration and return to the default rules, parties will only invest the
time and effort of looking for customization if the discussions are promising.
Could a plaintiff convince a defendant to agree to a procedural modification that
would dispense with all dispositive motions and proceed directly to jury trial?
Could a defendant convince a plaintiff to a rule that would subject the injured
plaintiff to unlimited medical examinations? Neither seems terribly likely in
most cases, but we should not confuse the idea of permitting customization with
the image of requiring customization. The search for customization would
proceed only as long as both litigants saw reason to continue the search.
Second, one can easily imagine that with experience, one or more procedural
variants would gain popularity, decreasing the marginal cost of customization.
The investment required to draft a procedural customization from whole cloth is
vastly higher than the cost of simply adopting an existing variation by reference.
The experience of arbitration agreements is informative in this regard. In
theory, every party wishing to include an arbitration agreement can sit down
and negotiate the precise terms of every aspect of the arbitration that is to
54

In Section IV.D. infra, I address the concern that customization might cause less efficient
expenditures by the courts. In this section, I focus exclusively on the question of whether the
disputants would realize any efficiency gains from customized procedures.
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follow. What most do, instead, is incorporate by reference an existing set of
publicly-available arbitration rules, with perhaps a few modifications or details
relevant to their particular dispute. I would expect that, with experience, the
choice to customize a litigation procedure would present only marginal
transaction costs because of the availability of information about what previous
litigants have chosen to customize.55
In at least some circumstances, therefore, litigants would likely discover and
codify opportunities for procedural variations that create mutual benefit.56
C. Saving the Civil Trial (By Changing It?)
In 2004, Marc Galanter published his long-awaited final report on the
“Vanishing Trial,”57 and much of the legal community has reacted with alarm.
The Vanishing Trial Project was the largest ever undertaken by the American
Bar Association Section on Litigation, and it has spawned numerous
conferences, symposia, and follow-up efforts. Galanter’s data-intensive survey
of the landscape of modern litigation, the foundation of the project’s report,
traced trial rates in federal courts over four decades. The statistic most cited
from these studies showed that the civil trial rate in federal courts dropped from
11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002.58 During the same years, courts have witnessed
a five-fold increase in cases initiated,59 and a dramatic increase in the number of
judges60 and lawyers.61 Many have suggested, therefore, that the data show a
more complex picture than that initially suggested by the theme of a “vanishing
trial.”62 Nevertheless, all empirical evidence suggests that the judiciary and the
litigation process have undergone fundamental changes in the recent past.
55
In many respects, this has been the experience of the “public good” represented by
corporate law. Much of corporate law is essentially a default rule, from which investors and
corporations are free to negotiate deviations, if they are so inclined. Most do not, but the
option exists and some standardized variations have developed. Cf. Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 62
(2005) (“standard corporate law . . . is open to all sorts of unusual arrangements: virtually all
of its key requirements are merely default rules, waivable at the option of the individual firm
or its participants.”) Perhaps the experience will parallel the development of the Uniform
Commercial Code, whose provisions have been guided in large part by developments in
private commercial practices.
56
A customized procedure is value creating, of course, only if it creates benefit for the
litigants without merely externalizing costs on others. It would not do, for example, for
litigants to create rules they favor but which intolerably disfavor non-disputants or the public
at large. For more on the limits of customization, see Section IV, infra.
57
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 459 (2004).
58
Id. at 459.
59
Id. at 461.
60
Id. at 5001-501.
61
Id. at 521.
62
See John Lande, Replace “The Vanishing Trial” With More Helpful Myths, 23
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 168 (Nov. 2005);
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Many observers of the legal system view the decline of jury trial rates as
unfortunate, with some even treating it as catastrophic. To some observers, the
decline in rates of civil trials is most troubling because it means a decrease in
the frequency with which juries operate. Building on de Tocqueville’s
observation that juries are “political institutions,” rather than merely
components of the judicial bureaucracy, some fear a decline in the “republican”
function of juries: “placing the real direction of society in the hands of the
governed.”63 Proponents of the jury system also point to the unique capacity of
juries to play a socializing role, through deliberation and pronouncements about
important shared values.64 The random make-up of juries makes them distinct
from any other actors within the political system. They are more diverse than
judges, lawmakers, or even private factfinders such as arbitrators. In short,
juries may serve a critical democratic function as “the whole community’s
spokesman,”65 and a decline in civil trial rates means that they have fewer
opportunities to perform that function.
Others see the decline in civil trial rates as troubling because it signals a move
away from the norm-establishing function of trials. Trials are set up as clashes
between right and wrong. In most instances, trials typically produce a clearlyidentifiable winner and loser. Some see this as one of the biggest weaknesses of
trials, particularly in a complex, post-modern world.66 Others, however, see the
move away from these bold pronouncements of truth and right as an
unacceptable slide toward moral relativism.67 Trials demand line-drawing, an
outcome superior to compromise or silence in many contexts.68
Still others mourn the apparent decline of the role of the civil trial because of
the decline’s impact on the legal profession. In the wake of declining
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 689
(2004).
63
Stephan Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, 1
J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 973, 974 (2004) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 291 (Philips Bradley trans., [1848] 1945); see also Patricia Lee Refo, The
Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. VI (“The cost of losing that citizen participation in
government [provided by jury service] is impossible to calculate.”).
64
See ELLEN E. SWARD, DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY TRIAL 52-65 (2002).
65
Landsman, supra note ___, at 975.
66
See e.g. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM & MARY L REV (1996).
67
See Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD.
627 (2004) (“The rejection of trials may also evidence a new and troubling cultural
preference for compromise over standing on principles.”); Refo, supra note ___, at 58
(“Settlement and compromise can be viewed as just another step toward moral relativism.”).
68
The contrast between settlement-as-compromise and litigation-as-no-compromise is not
nearly as stark in practice. See, e.g. Jeff Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV.
881 (2004) (pointing out that many litigated cases produce results that involve negotiation
and compromise, with judges rather than litigants doing the compromising); Whose Dispute
is it?, supra note ___, at 2669.
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opportunities to try a case to its conclusion, “firms now routinely elect new
litigation partners who have never even second-chaired a trial.”69 As fewer
attorneys have experience litigating cases, some suggest that a self-perpetuating
phenomenon arises. The less experience a lawyer has with trial, the more
hesitant that lawyer will be to take a case all the way to trial. As a result, still
fewer attorneys receive trial experience, augmenting the dynamic.70
Furthermore, the distribution of litigated cases is not evenly spread among all
attorneys. It is not that every lawyer has an equally reduced chance of going to
trial. Instead, some have suggested that an increasingly small percentage of
attorneys is handling virtually all of the litigation. Describing this move toward
a smaller, more insular bar as the “ghettoization of trials,” some commentators
believe that the trend points toward the decline of the profession.71
Why are trials vanishing? No consensus has emerged that trials are, in fact,
vanishing, but the data unmistakably reflect a change in the patterns of
litigation. In the federal courts, at least, far fewer disputes result in trials. If in
fact, the civil trial is in need of rescue, it is important to understand why. The
cause(s) of these complex phenomena, of course, elude simple identification.72
Some have suggested that the meteoric rise in the use of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) procedures is the reason that fewer cases survive in the
litigation system long enough to conclude in a jury trial.73 Arbitration clauses
are now nearly ubiquitous in consumer products, employment agreements, and
health care contracts. Their routine enforcement has meant that a certain
category of disputes rarely remains in a trial court.74 Private mediation has
proliferated, with virtually every area of the law now seeing routine use of
mediators to resolve disputes in a non-adjudicatory setting.75 In some
jurisdictions, litigants are now required to engage in mediation or other ADR
mechanism before proceeding through various stages of litigation.76
69

See Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, 30 LITIGATION 1, 1
(Winter 2004).
70
See Refo, supra note ___, at 4.
71
See, e.g., Landsman, supra note ___, at 981.
72
For a well-articulated cautionary note regarding our limited ability to reliably draw causal
inferences from the data currently available, see Stephen Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition
Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference in Searching for the Causes and
Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571 (2004).
73
Despite this widely-held perspective, the empirical data have thus far delivered a more
complex picture of the interactions between ADR and litigation. For a survey of that
literature, see Tom Stipanowitch, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”, 10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 7
(2004). See also John Lande, The Vanishing Trial Report, An Alternative View of the Data,
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 19 (2004).
74
See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute
for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 17 (2003).
75
See SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A. MCEWEN, NANCY H. ROGERS, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY &
PRACTICE, § 2:1, 2-1 (2nd ed. 2005).
76
See Id. at §§ 7:1-7:2. For a survey of the institutionalization of dispute resolution
mechanisms, see Nancy Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization in THE
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Others explain the decline in civil trial rates by pointing to procedural changes
in the litigation process—changes that have made jury trials less attractive to
litigants.77 The increasing expense of discovery practice, for example, often
makes the prospect of full-blown litigation unjustifiable from a cost-benefit
perspective.78 Furthermore, the privatization of discovery embodied in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure decreases litigants’ incentives to use trial as a
device for uncovering information relevant to the resolution of the dispute.79
“Before 1938, trial was often the only real way to do discovery … so all things
being equal, extensive discovery will lower the trial rate because it produces
information.”80
Some point also to the bench as responsible for the decline in civil trial rates.
Judges have undeniably taken on a far more “managerial” posture when
overseeing cases. Multiple aspects of Rule 16 make this role clear. Judges
manage discovery schedules, dispositive motion timetables, witness lists, and
information exchanges.81 Judges also now more commonly engage personally
in settlement conferences and other efforts at resolving the dispute before trial.82
Furthermore, judges are now far more likely to grant summary judgment
motions, making trial considerably more infrequent.83 Finally, some have
suggested that a fundamental change in judicial temperament explains the
decline in civil trials. Specifically, one hears of an increasing number of trial
court judges who have lost faith in trials as an appropriate dispute resolution

HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 487 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds.,
2005).
77
Not all procedural changes should have necessarily resulted in a decline in trial rates.
Relaxing the pleadings standards, for example, allows more litigants into the system. These
additional litigants would be less likely to survive subsequent dispositive motions than their
counterparts. Therefore, one part of the explanation for a decline in trial rates would also
properly point to the increase in cases entering the judicial system. See Stephan c. Yeazell,
Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got: The
Vanishing Civil Trial, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 948 (2004); Galanter, supra note ___,
at 478.
78
See Refo, supra note ___, at 3.
79
Yeazell, supra note ___, at 950 (“By privatizing the uncovering of historical facts we have
placed the power in the hands of the parties—power they regularly employ to settle their
cases without adjudication on the merits.”).
80
Id. at 951.
81
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
82
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485
(1985) (discussing the role of judges in settlement conferences); E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE
PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION,
AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES (1989).
83
See, e.g. Stephen Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah? 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 591
(2004) (citing one study that found rate of summary judgment granting going from 1.8% in
1960 to 7.7% in 2000).
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mechanism.84 And some judges have even come to view trials as a “failure,”
something to be avoided if at all possible.85
One more potential contributor to the decline in trial rates, though surely not the
only one, stems from the relatively unattractive picture of litigation our courts
currently offer disputants. In the past two years, the American Bar Association
has devoted enormous resources to a project re-examining the rules governing
jury trials. In 2005, the ABA adopted a set of “Principles for Juries and Jury
Trials” aimed at modernizing the jury trial, bringing added efficiency, and
promoting justice.86 Many other reforms are under consideration or are being
adopted in isolated jurisdictions.87 The procedural barge, however, is slow to
turn.88
And even if the procedural barge turns in a direction that makes trial more
favorable to a larger percentage of disputants, it still suffers from its
immutability. There will always be a segment of the disputing population who
would prefer a modified version of litigation over whatever the current single
procedural vision might be. Perhaps the problem is not that our single set of
rules is not what it should be. Perhaps the problem is that no uniform set of
rules will be adequately attractive to all litigants, leading them to an alternative
means of resolving their dispute.
The opportunity for specific disputants mutually to customize their litigation
experience, however, changes that calculation.
Sophisticated business
transactions routinely include arbitration agreements in part because of the
flexible procedure such agreements offer.89 To the extent that disputants have
84

See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith 53 U.CHI.L.REV. 494 (1986).
See Butler, supra note ___, at 627; Landsman, supra note ___, at 984. (“The rhetoric
describing trials as a systematic failure or pathology must be challenged, especially among
sitting judges.”)
86
American Bar Association, supra note ___.
87
See, e.g., Robert J. Grey, Jr., Striving for a Just Solution: Our Work to Improve the Dispute
Resolution System Benefits Society and the Profession ABA Journal , 91 A.B.A.J. 6 (July
2005) (stating that “[i]nnovative, creative approaches include limitations on discovery,
setting reasonable time limits for civil trials, reducing the number of expert witnesses, and
more discipline by judges and lawyers in managing the costs and time associated with
litigation”).
88
Procedural changes have occurred more rapidly at the state court level. The initial vision
of inter-state uniformity in state court procedures has been all but abandoned, with an
increase in “localism.” One observer suggested that this trend might signal a new federalism
in state civil procedure. See Glen Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice:
Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2005).
89
Arbitration agreements appearing in transactions between sophisticated business parties do
not run the same set of risks one sees associated with the arbitration clauses that appear with
increasing frequency in consumer and employment contexts. Arbitration clauses appearing in
adhesion contract may represent nothing more than a crass calculation by the more powerful
party (the business) that the weaker party will be bound by arbitration’s less advantageous
terms (for example, limited remedies). Between sophisticated parties, however, I have less
85
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mutually lost faith in some aspect of the trial system, customization affords
them an opportunity to re-craft the litigation experience in a way that makes it
more attractive. In short, customization may help to preserve those aspects of
the jury trial system that are most important to our system of justice, by inviting
disputants back into the courthouse.
III. CURRENT EXPERIENCES WITH CUSTOMIZATION
Some descriptions of litigation hold it up as a well-defined, predictable
sequence of pre-determined stems, applied equally to all disputants appearing in
court. This vision of litigation is, in some ways, the fantasy of first year Civil
Procedure students, eager to grasp solid answers about how the litigation
process unfolds.90 At a broad level of abstraction, it is certainly true that every
piece of litigation includes predictable, rule-driven components. Disputants
define the scope of the dispute, courts make determinations about the scope of
their authority, disputants engage in information exchange, the factfinder makes
determinations of the facts which are then compared to the relevant substantive
legal standards, and so on. In the details, however, one finds considerable
variation, even within the same court system, even with cases that share
outward similarities. The fact that litigants already make choices that shape
their litigation experience is important to note because it suggests—
accurately—that we have already begun the customization experiment. Though
perhaps not explicitly, we are already exploring the appropriate boundaries of
customization.
Isolated and relatively modest versions of customization are already available to
litigants, providing us at least a partial window onto the experiences we might
expect with broader customization. Customization currently takes shape in one
of two ways. Some forms of customization occur before litigation commences,
through contractual agreements between the parties regarding an aspect of the
litigation process that is yet to come. Other forms of customization take place
during litigation, either contractually or through existing procedural devices that
concern that one side is simply pulling the wool over the other side’s eyes. Instead, I suspect
that the attraction is based, in part, on arbitration’s opportunities for customization.
90
I have no empirical data to support my assertion that this is among the things about which
my first year students fantasize. I make this inference based on their questions and
comments. This vision of trial as a singular phenomenon, however, is not limited to first year
law students. For example, in offering a contrary perspective to those who view current trial
rates as demonstrating that the civil trial is vanishing, John Lande writes, “The vanishing trial
myth has three elements: (1) The, (2) Vanishing, and (3) Trial. ‘The’ implies, inaccurately,
that there is a single uniform phenomenon of trial.” John Lande, Replace “The Vanishing
Trial” with More Helpful Myths, 23 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 161 (2005). See also John Lande,
Shifting the Focus from the Myth of the “Vanishing Trial” to Complex Conflict Management
Systems, or I Learned Almost Everything I Need to Know About Conflict Resolution From
Marc Galanter, ___ CARDOZO J. CONFL. RESOL. ___, 4 (forthcoming 2006) (copy on file with
author).
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provide explicit opportunities for parties to tailor their litigation experiences. I
provide several examples of each kind of customization below.
A. Pre-Litigation Customization
Contracts containing choice of forum clauses provide one example of private,
pre-dispute customization by prospective litigants. With increasing frequency,
parties drafting a contract anticipate the possibility of a dispute arising out of
the contract. As their names suggests, choice of forum clauses specify the
forum in which the contracting parties agree to bring any complaints within the
scope of the contractual term.91 Courts generally enforce choice of forum
clauses, holding the litigants to their previous agreement about the location of
the litigation.92 The result is customization, in the sense that the disputants are
experiencing litigation as they envisioned it should proceed. Litigants who
agreed to a choice of forum clause may have an experience quite different than
the one they would have had in the absence of the clause. Their litigation may
take place in an entirely different court than it would have in the absence of the
pre-dispute contractual provision. In short, this is the litigants’ fight, and the
enforced choice of forum clause allows the fight to take place where the
litigants decided they wanted to fight.
Just as parties entering a contractual relationship sometimes specify the forum
in which any subsequent disputes are to take place, parties sometimes agree to
the substantive rules that are to govern any such disputes. Using “choice of
law” provisions, parties are able to control with reasonable certainty the
substantive legal standards against which their subsequent behaviors are to be
assessed. Many perceive states’ baseline conflict-of-laws rules as uncertain,
91

An expansive choice of forum clause might read, “Any and all disputes arising out of or
related to the creation, performance, or breach of any terms of this contract shall be litigated
exclusively in a court in the state of X.” This is an example of a so-called “mandatory”
choice of forum clause because it provides that the exclusive forum for litigation is in the
state of X. Other choice of forum clauses are merely “permissive,” and courts routinely
interpret permissive choice of forum clauses as an indication of the litigants’ consent to
litigation in the specified forum, but they are not viewed as barring litigation in other
jurisdictions. See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §3803.1 (2005).
92
At one point, courts were reluctant to give the clauses effect. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1972) (“Forum-selection clauses have historically not been
favored by American courts. Many courts, federal and state, have declined to enforce such
clauses on the grounds that they were ‘contrary to public policy,’ or that their effect was to
‘oust the jurisdiction’ of the court.”). Over the past several decades, however, courts have
viewed choice of forum clauses with considerably more favor. Chief Justice Berger wrote, in
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, that a “forum clause should control absent a
strong showing that it should be set aside.” Id. at 15. The question of whether a choice of
forum is sufficiently “reasonable” to be enforced is one for which “there are no hard-and-fast
rules, no precise formulae.” D’Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems, 570 F.Supp. 708, 712
(D.R.I. 1983) (citing at least nine factors included in the determination of a choice of forum
clause’s reasonableness).
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vague, or even litigation-inducing.93 Parties understandably seek mechanisms
like choice-of-law provisions to reduce the uncertainty associated with multijurisdictional transactions. They “want to know at the time of entering into a
contract which state’s law will be applied, rather than waiting for the judge to
tell them when deciding a contract dispute.”94 The modern trend is for courts to
enforce most choice-of-law provisions in contracts.95 Choice-of-law provisions,
therefore, represent an important opportunity for litigants to customize their
litigation experience. In some cases, a choice-of-law provision may simply
name the jurisdiction whose laws the court would have applied in the absence of
any choice-of-law provision. In this sense, the provisions merely provide
security or certainty to parties who may fear an unpredicted result from a
court’s choice-of-law analysis. In most cases, however, the function of a choice
of law provision is to specify a set of substantive laws that are at least somewhat
different from the laws the forum state’s default conflicts-of-law rules would
have otherwise specified. The provisions thus customize the disputants’
litigation experience.
Litigants can also choose to waive the right to a jury in civil cases, providing
another illustration of an existing opportunity for customization. By agreement,
parties can waive the right to a jury.96 For example, a contractual jury waiver
clause might read, “Each party hereby irrevocably waives any right it may have
to trial by jury in any action, suit, counterclaim, or proceeding arising out of or
relating to this agreement.”97 If upheld, a pre-litigation98 contractual jury
waiver customizes the litigation experience of the disputants. As a general
matter, federal courts will enforce contractual waivers of jury rights, though

93

See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L.
REV. 363, 366 (choice of law provisions help “reduce the uncertainty of vague conflict-oflaws default rules”).
94
Id. at 403.
95
For a historical analysis of the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions in the United
States, see Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law,
67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151 (2000); David Frisch, Contractual Choice of Law and the Prudential
Foundations of Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 58-65 (2003); Ribstein, supra note
93, at 370-371.
96
See RDO Financial Services Co. v. Powell, 191 F.Supp.2d 811 (N.D.Tex 2002) (“Although
the right of trial by jury in civil actions is protected by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution, that right, like other constitutional rights, may be waived by prior written
agreement of the parties.”). However, in state courts, contractual waivers of jury rights may
violate state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Bank South v. Howard, 264 Ga. 339, 340
(Ga. 1994) (“pre-litigation contractual waivers of jury trial are not provided for by
[Georgia’s] Constitution or Code and are not to be enforced in cases tried under the laws of
Georgia.”). Even in those states, waivers are permitted through stipulation or by open, oral
declaration in court. See id.
97
Paracor Finance, Inc. v. General Elec., 79 F.3d 878, 894 (9th Cir. 1996).
98
In addition to the pre-dispute customization described in this section, jury waivers also can
occur during litigation. Litigants can declare a waiver explicitly to a judge, and a litigant is
deemed to have waived any right to a jury by failing to make an appropriate jury demand.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
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they will construe the contracts narrowly.99 Pre-litigation contracts containing
explicit jury waivers provide a third illustration of the opportunities litigants
have to shape their experiences in court before a lawsuit even commences. If
one or both of the litigants prefers to have a jury decide the facts, the litigation
will look one way. If, however, the litigants mutually prefer to have a judicial
factfinder, contractual jury waivers permit them to have their way. Their
litigation experience is thus customizable.
To this discussion of existing, pre-litigation customization opportunities, I
should add one clarifying note about arbitration. Arbitration clauses may
represent the most conspicuous example of a jury-waiving contractual
arrangement. To be certain, if parties agree to bring a dispute before an
arbitrator, they are waiving their right to a jury.100 However, an arbitration
agreement does not customize the litigation experience of the disputants within
the court system. Instead, it wrests the dispute out of the court and places it in
the hands of an arbitrator, who acts as judge and factfinder.101 Arbitral
decisions return to the court system only if questions of enforcement or appeal
arise, and the latter only in a narrow set of circumstances.102 Arbitrations are
appropriately conceived of as alternatives to litigation. Because they occur
outside of the courthouse, outside of the litigation system, for purposes of this
article, I do not consider them to be examples of customized litigation.103
B. Customization during Litigation
Once a lawsuit is commenced, the parties have numerous opportunities to
coordinate in shaping the course of the litigation process. Some avenues for
customization during litigation take the form of contractual agreements,
paralleling the pre-litigation measures described immediately above. A simple
illustration of this type of customization is found in the prevalence of so-called
“high-low agreements,” which serve to set parameters around the effects of
various jury awards. Litigants also find a few explicit opportunities to engage
in customization within current procedural rules. Most customization within the
rules is currently relatively modest, particularly in contrast to some of their
extra-judicial counterparts. For example, litigants make elections about
references to magistrate judges, about discovery orders, and about jury
instructions. Nevertheless, as these examples illustrate, modern litigation
99

See Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1981) (contrasting the narrow
construction of jury waiver provisions with courts’ treatment of arbitration clauses generally).
100
See, e.g., Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) (The “loss
of the right to a jury trial is a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to
arbitrate.”).
101
For an overview of the arbitration process, see Sarah Rudolph Cole and Kristen M.
Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 318 (Michael L. Moffitt &
Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
102
See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 – 10 (2000).
103
I return to the question of arbitration and its relationship to customized litigation below in
Section IV.D.3., infra.
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procedure provides explicit opportunities for litigants to tailor some aspects of
their experience in court.
1. High-Low Agreements
A high-low agreement is a form of a contingent settlement, with the eventual
obligations of the parties being dictated by the result of a jury trial.104 Litigants
typically enter a high-low agreement during the course of a trial, or even while
the jury is deliberating, having negotiated boundaries on the award the plaintiff
will eventually recover. The “high” number represents a ceiling, the most the
plaintiff can recover. If the jury comes back with an award in excess of the high
number, the plaintiff recovers only the previously agreed-to “high” number.
The “low” number sets out the minimum payment from the defendant to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff recovers that minimum amount even if the jury awarded
less—or even if the jury found for the defendant entirely. If the jury returns a
verdict in between the high and the low numbers, most high-low agreements
provide that the jury’s verdict is the actual award.105
Disputants’ motivation to enter high-low agreements stems primarily from
nervousness that the jury’s verdict might fall outside of the range both sides
consider most likely. In a sense the defendant is “buying” the right to be free
from the worry of a jackpot jury verdict against the defendant. The plaintiff is
selling its lottery ticket in exchange for the certainty that it will recover no less
than the “low” amount. One can easily imagine circumstances in which neither
side can tolerate the risk of an award falling at one extreme or the other.106
Both sides in a high-low agreement abandon the fantasy of a home-run verdict,
in exchange for eliminating the prospect of a nightmare verdict.
As a general matter, courts have enforced high-low agreements.107 Like any
contract, high-low agreements can present ambiguity or conflicting

104

For more on contingent agreements, see Michael Moffitt, Agreeing to Disagree About the
Future 87 MARQ. L. REV. 691 (2004).
105
See Molly McDonough, High-Lows’ Ups and Downs, 2005 A.B.A. J., 12-13 (Aug. 2005).
106
The nature of high-low agreements makes it difficult to know with precision how
frequently they are used. One estimate suggested that disputants discuss the possibility in at
least a quarter of litigated cases, with one in ten cases actually using them. See McDonough
at 12. In addition to high-low agreements, parties routinely use a variety of other mechanisms
for similar purposes. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Refinancing Civil Litigation, 51 DPLLR 183,
196 (2001) (“When settlements occur, they are, as compared with our reference point in
1925, as likely to look like a corporate merger than a cash sale at a supermarket. Just the set
of names should convince most of us of this proposition: Mary Carter agreements, Sliding
Scale agreements, High-Low agreements structured settlements, and cede-back agreements.
Each of these is a staple not of bet-the-industry class actions but of run-of-the-mill tort
litigation.”).
107
See Molly McDonough, High-Lows’ Ups and Downs, 2005 A.B.A. J., 12 (Aug. 2005).
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interpretations. What happens if the jury is hung or if a mistrial is declared?108
What happens if the jury comes back with an award in one amount, but then
also finds the plaintiff to have been contributorily negligent at a level that would
substantially reduce the total?109 Cases of contested high-low agreements are
rare, and one experienced lawyer described their enforcement as more of “a
gentleman’s agreement” than a matter of precise contractual construction.110
Nevertheless, all indications are that such agreements are routinely enforced by
courts, making them an option for extra-judicial customization of the litigation
experience.
2. Referrals to Magistrates
Magistrate judges play an increasingly important role in civil litigation within
the federal courts.111 Federal district court judges have the discretionary power
to assign a wide range of judicial activities to magistrate judges. Civil litigants
in federal court routinely find themselves appearing before a magistrate judge
on evidentiary matters, for example.112 Indeed with the exception of certain
dispositive motions, motions to certify a class, and requests for injunctive relief,
federal district court judges are empowered to refer “any pretrial matter pending
before the court” to a magistrate judge.113 In some cases, therefore, litigants
have no control over the introduction of these non-Article III judges into the
litigation process.
However, the judicial code also envisions opportunities for litigants to make
customizing choices with respect to the roles of magistrate judges. Under 28
U.S.C. §636(c), litigants may consent to having “any or all proceedings in a jury
or nonjury civil matter” determined by a magistrate judge, rather than a district
108

See Camarda v. Borman, 1997 WL 33344418 (Mich. App.) (1997) (court ordered
defendant to pay costs associated with mistrial declared during first trial, notwithstanding the
high-low agreement the parties reached during the subsequent trial).
109
See Batista v. Elite Ambulette Service, Inc., 281 A.D.2d 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (Jury
awarded pre-apportionment damages of $225,000, but found plaintiff 75% negligent. The
court found that the high-low agreement silent on the question of comparative negligence and
interpreted it to relate only to the pre-apportioned damages.).
110
McDonough, supra note ___ at 12.
111
See Philip Pro & Thomas Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and
Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503 (1995);
Tim A. Baker, Shifting Powers in the Federal Courts: Symposium Issue: The Expanding Role
of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts. 39 VAL. U.L. REV. 661, 661 (2005); Brendan
Linehan Shannon, The Federal Magistrates Act: A new Article III Analysis for a New Breed
of Judicial Officer. 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 253, 253 (1991).
112
See Tim A. Baker, Shifting Powers in the Federal Courts: Symposium Issue: The
Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts. 39 VAL. U.L. REV. 661, 661
(2005) (“Lawyers and parties who have watched their cases progress through the federal
courts no doubt can attest to the fact that more commonly it is the magistrate judges, rather
than the district judges, who assume active, pretrial roles in case management and settlement-the mainstay of modern federal court civil practice.”).
113
28 U.S.C. § 363(b).
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court judge.114 The process of referring a case to a magistrate judge varies by
jurisdiction, with some districts engaging in more “encouraging” than others.115
In all districts, however, section 636(c) invites litigants to make the fundamental
choice about the person who will oversee their trial. References to magistrate
judges are, therefore, an example of customization taking place within the
existing rules.
In most important regards, magistrate judges and district court judges operate in
identical ways. Magistrate judges apply the same legal standards and the same
procedures as federal district court judges.116 If parties consent to have a
magistrate judge preside over the trial, appeals go directly to federal appellate
courts, exactly as if judgment had been entered by a district court.117 In many
respects, therefore, magistrate judges mirror the functioning of district court
judges.
Why then might parties decide to consent to have a magistrate judge preside
over a trial, instead of an Article III district court judge? The answer stems
primarily from differences between the dockets of district court judges and
those of magistrate judges. Magistrate judges’ calendars are more controlled,
providing litigants with greater predictability and security with respect to trial
dates.118 For litigants whose mutual assessment of their case is that they each
value the speed and certainty of magistrate judges’ trial calendars more than
they value whatever protections or benefits derive from having an Article III
judge preside over the trial, section 636(c) provides an opportunity for
beneficial customization.
3. Discovery
Among the most important characteristics of modern civil procedure is the
extent to which it relies on individual parties’ efforts in discovery to aid in the
factfinding process.119 The rules contemplate that virtually all of discovery will
take place extra-judicially, with the courts intervening only when invited by the
114

28 USC § 636(c)(1).
Pro & Hnatowski, supra note ___, at 1528 (“Several district courts have . . . employed
innovative techniques to encourage section 636(c) consents in civil cases” including opt-out
provisions, waiver approaches, or random default assignment to magistrate judges.).
116
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(d).
117
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).
118
Caseload relief also serves as a primary explanation for district court judges’ openness to
(and even enthusiasm for) referrals to magistrate judges. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The
Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered
Aspirations, 86 GEO. L. J. 2589, 2610 (1998) (“Given that federal judges . . . plead for
assistance in their caseload without radical expansion of their ranks, it is nor surprising that
federal judges . . . sanction the delegation of some of their work to an array of non lifetenured ‘judges.’”).
119
At an early point in time, pleadings were used to develop facts, instead of discovery. See
Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L. J. 727 (2005) (cataloguing the
historical functions of pleadings within the litigation system).
115
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parties, and even then, only reluctantly. The modern reality is that most judges
hate to deal with discovery disputes, and the rules make it relatively easy for
them to stay out of most discovery fights.120 In short, discovery is essentially
party-driven process.
To facilitate the parties’ efforts in managing their own discovery processes,
procedural rules include three different kinds of provisions related to discovery.
The first (and probably most familiar) set of provisions sets out the shape of the
discovery devices, along with limitations on their use, and procedures for
complaining about misbehavior by others. For example, the rules specify that
one may take a deposition upon written question of any person, but one can
send interrogatories only to opposing parties.121 The rules also tell litigants the
circumstances under which they may seek to have a party undergo a mental
examination; they spell out penalties for failure to comply with the various
requirements; and so on.122 This first category of rules is important, of course,
because they set out the parameters of the discovery mechanisms available to
parties.
The second category of provisions in the discovery rules are those that require
the parties to engage in a certain degree of customization. For example, Rule
26(f) provides that prior to their scheduling conference, litigants “must …
develop a proposed discovery plan,” including any proposed adjustments to the
default timeline, form, or content of discovery efforts.123 In this sense, the
procedural rules essentially force customization, or at least force an effort at
customization. (If the parties cannot agree to a discovery plan, the rules
contemplate judicial intervention.124) Recognizing the widely divergent set of
cases that all must operate under the same basic discovery rules, customized
discovery plans enable courts and litigants to agree mutually to treat a complex
antitrust cases differently from they way they would treat a relatively simple
breach of contract claim.
The third category of provisions in the discovery rules contemplate opening the
doors to even greater customization, though the rules do not require it. Rule 29
120

Judges’ distaste for discovery disputes is widespread and well known. See, e.g., Robert
W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 723 (1998) (“[J]udges are supposed to enforce the rules (discovery
rules), but they do not, partially because (as all the lawyers and the judges agree) they dislike
discovery disputes, treating them as quarrels between bickering children...”); Earl C. Dudley,
Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 198 (1992) (“judges tend to view discovery disputes with
distaste and avoid dealing with them as long as possible.”).
121
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
122
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 35; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (failure to comply with
discovery requirements).
123
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
124
See JAY E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY AND
DISCLOSURE 26 (2d ed 2002); 6A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note ___, at §1522.1
(2005).
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provides: “[u]nless otherwise directed by the court, the parties may by written
stipulation … modify other procedures governing or limitations placed upon
discovery,” with the exception of certain changes that would affect the overall
Rule 29 does not require
calendar or timeline of the litigation.125
customization.126 It treats the rest of the discovery rules as default rules, off of
which the parties may negotiate deviations. The idea of customization,
therefore, is already well-established within discovery.
4. Jury Instructions
Crafting jury instructions presents a final example of the ways in which current
procedural rules give litigants an opportunity to shape their litigation
experience. In a simple case, litigants might opt for the straight-forward and
appeals-tested pattern jury instructions for the jurisdiction in which the litigation
is taking place.127 And in many cases, to be certain, the process of crafting jury
instructions is a purely adversarial undertaking, with each side hoping to frame
the issues and legal standards in ways most favorable to its side. Nevertheless,
litigants sometimes present a mutually-crafted set of jury instructions to the
judge. These customized jury instructions represent a deviation from the
“standard” instructions, and the parties’ stipulations indicate that each party
views the instructions as superior in the context of their particular litigation.
The process of customizing jury instructions holds at least two advantages for
litigants. First, they present both sides with an opportunity to craft the
instructions in a way they believe will be advantageous. Depending on the
timing of these negotiations and the perceptions of each side, it is entirely
possible that each side will believe a particular phraseology to be to its
advantage.
Second, and even more significant, when civil litigants jointly present jury
instructions to a judge, they are functionally waiving any right to appeal based
on the inadequacy or inaccuracy of those jury instructions. A criminal
defendant might be able to sustain an appeal if his or her counsel stipulated to
an erroneous and damaging jury instruction without adequately involving the
defendant.128 In a civil context, however, clients will be bound by the decisions
125

Fed. R. Civ. P. 29. Similar provisions appear in some state civil procedure codes as well.
See, e.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 191.1.
126
See Jay E. Grenig, Stipulations Regarding Discovery Procedure, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
547, 549 (1998) (“[i]n 1993, Rule 29 was amended to give greater opportunity for litigants to
agree upon modifications to discovery procedures or to limit discovery.”).
127
Many treatises and practitioner guides provide pattern jury instructions. See, e.g., Robin
C. Larner & Eric Mayer, Pattern Jury Instructions 75A Am Jur 2d TRIAL § 1168 (2004).
128
Compare United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986) (court can review
jury instruction under a plain error standard, even when the defendant fails to object to them)
with U.S. v. Ward, 914 F.2d 1340, 1344 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing U.S. v. Alexander, 695
F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2458, 77 L.Ed.2d 1337
(1983) ( “A party is precluded from arguing on appeal errors which he invited.”).
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of their counsel. Even if the act of submitting the stipulated jury instructions
did not constitute an express waiver of objection, the party submitting the
instruction would surely not then turn around and raise an exception to those
instructions. Absent an objection at the trial court level, no appeal would
survive.
Judges are under no obligation to adopt the jury instructions proposed by the
litigants—even if all litigants stipulate to the instructions.129 As a practical
matter, however, it is quite unlikely that a judge would stand in the way of a set
of instructions both sides have crafted and accepted. Jury instructions,
therefore, represent an opportunity for litigants to customize, by mutual
agreement, their litigation experience.
IV. LIMITS ON CUSTOMIZATION
Legitimate opportunities to customize litigation are not infinite. Despite Henry
Ford’s quotation from the beginning of this article, Ford automobiles are now
available in dozens of different colors, along with literally thousands of
different combinations of other options. There is a limit, of course, to the
amount of customization you can do to a car made by Ford and have it remain a
Ford. If you paint it some color other than black, no one would seriously
suggest that the car is anything but a Ford. But if you change the motor and the
chassis to something other than Ford, at least some automotive enthusiasts
would say that the car has ceased to be a Ford. Similarly, at some point, with
enough tinkering, litigation would cease to be litigation and would begin to be
something else.
There are—and should be—limits on the kinds of
customization litigants should expect to have enforced.
Whether one accepts my argument that we should increase opportunities for
customization, it is important to recognize that customization is already
happening—even if we have not previously labeled it as such. In the section
below, I suggest every effort at customization must be consistent with at least
three criteria: First, and most obviously, private litigants cannot re-shape the
courts’ roles in ways that contravene the constitutional or statutory authorities
that created the court. Second, efforts at customization cannot circumvent the
legitimate public interests in having litigation proceed in a particular fashion.
Third, litigants cannot customize their litigation experiences in ways that
prejudice the rights of non-litigants. I conclude this section by acknowledging
and addressing some of the principal concerns generated by the prospect of
customized litigation.

129

See, e.g., Whatley v. Crawford & Co., 15 Fed. Appx. 625, 632 (10th Cir. 2001) (court
refused to submit stipulated instructions to the jury).
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A. Constitutional and Statutory Limits
Courts, and the procedures they apply to litigation, are established through a
combination of Constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules. These laws are the
most conspicuous constraints on private customization. Unless these laws
provide otherwise, litigants’ individual or joint decisions have little effect on the
structures within which the litigation takes place. Put differently, the laws
establishing courts serve, implicitly or explicitly, as a ceiling on the degree to
which private litigants can tailor their experiences.
Perhaps the easiest illustration of these parameters comes from the question of
subject matter jurisdiction. Every court is created with limited subject matter
jurisdiction. Federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is limited both by the
Constitution and by the statutes creating district and appellate courts. Even
state court systems, which often include a court of “general” subject matter
jurisdiction, are empowered to hear only certain kinds of disputes. Certain
cases, such as patent or bankruptcy, are of exclusive federal subject matter
jurisdiction and cannot be heard in any state court. For other types of cases,
most states have established specific courts of limited subject matter
jurisdiction—traffic court, family court, probate court, and small claims court,
for example. No single court is empowered to hear all cases.
These court-establishing laws provide one non-negotiable limit on the ability of
disputants to customize their litigation experience. It is axiomatic that the
parties cannot create subject matter jurisdiction by consent.130 Parties cannot
waive objections to defects in subject matter jurisdiction.131 No contractual
provision can create subject matter jurisdiction where none exists statutorily.
Neighbors involved in a minor dispute over a property line cannot effectively
agree to appear in federal district court. Family members in a fight over a will
cannot bring their dispute before a traffic court judge, even if everyone in the
family consents to doing so. A family court cannot oversee litigation initiated
over the validity of a patent, even if all of the disputants prefer that forum over
the federal courts. Courts are created with certain limited powers, and those
powers are not a function of the desires of the disputants.132
130

See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., ___ U.S. ___; ___ S.Ct .___, 2006 WL 397863 (2006);
United States v. Cotton, 535, U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“subject-matter jurisdiction, because it
involves the court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”); United States
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 (1938); Commodities Futures Trading Com’n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 851 (1986); Beers v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir.
1988) ("The parties cannot create federal subject matter jurisdiction either by agreement or
consent.").
131
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
that, while a state may waive its sovereign immunity, a party may not waive defects in
subject matter jurisdiction); see also Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct.
2047, 2052 (1998) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 472 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)).
132
One could imagine a different set of statutes and rules establishing the court systems
within which litigation takes place. For example, there is no constitutional reason why
federal subject matter jurisdiction could not be at least partially customizable. Federal courts
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Certain aspects of the court system are fixed for all litigants, whether by rule, by
statute, or by Constitutional constraint. Distinguishing between these three
types of constraints is important, because they are not equally difficult to
change. The current rules of civil procedure and the current system of statutes
governing court systems are more easily amended than the constitutional
constraints within which litigation occurs. Nevertheless, the laws creating the
courts and their procedures serve as an outer limit on the customization options
for litigants.
B. Limits Based in the Public’s Interest in Litigation
The public has at least three different kinds of interests in litigation and in the
court system. The public has functional interests—we want courts to do certain
things for society, including aid in the resolution of disputes and clarify the
parameters of the law. The public has efficiency interests—we want courts to
perform their functions in ways that are mindful that public resources finance
the vast bulk of court expenses. The public has symbolic interests—we want
courts to say something about who we are and what our shared norms are. Each
of these public interests serves as a legitimate limitation on the scope of
permissible customization.
1. Functional Interests
Courts perform a number of functions in society, at least two of which are
directly relevant to the question of customization. First, courts are important as
a mechanism for resolving disputes. Second, courts play a critical role in
articulating rules and establishing meaningful precedents.133 Customization that
undercuts either of these functional interests would be troublesome.
Courts’ roles in the resolution of disputes are undeniable in many cases. Courts
resolve some disputes directly—either by ruling on a dispositive motion or by
entering judgment following a trial. In the vast majority of these cases, the

are currently statutorily empowered to hear diversity cases in which there is complete
diversity and in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. These are not
constitutional parameters, however. Congress clearly has the power to provide federal
subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving only “minimal” diversity, and it can clearly
change the amount in controversy. Similarly, for example, Congress could provide that
federal district courts would have subject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases in which (a)
the amount in controversy exceeds $100,000, or (b) the amount in controversy exceeds
$50,000 and both litigants consent to appearing in federal court. There are practical and
policy reasons why such an approach might not be wise, of course, but such an arrangement
would present no constitutional problems. It is the fact that Congress has not provided a
statutory basis for such customization that bars such customization.
133
See Luban, supra note ___, at 2622 (“[O]ur court system not only resolves disputes, but
also produces rules and precedents.”).
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court’s resolution is indeed a “resolution.”134 The case ends, one way or the
other. Furthermore, although the vast majority disputes are resolved without
trial,135 efforts at settlement routinely occur “in the shadow” of the prospect of
litigation.136 The most conspicuous examples of this occur on the proverbial
courthouse steps. Even in settlement discussions that take place well before any
prospect of litigation, each side’s calculations includes assessments of the risks
and opportunities presented by litigation. To the extent that society is better off
for having one fewer unresolved dispute, the court system typically earns the
credit.
Given this dispute-resolution function, we would understandably resist most
efforts at customization that would result in something other than the resolution
of disputes. We would not want to provide a blank ticket for disputants to reengage periodically in their arguments ad infinitum, for example. Of course, in
some circumstances, the current rules provide for something short of a final,
complete resolution.
In institutional reform litigation, for example,
(desegregating a school, overhauling a prison system, etc.) it is common for the
disputants to enter a consent decree that anticipates continued judicial
involvement over a period of years.137 Such cases are the exception, however.
Our clear preference is for our court system to provide final, binding resolution
to disputes as quickly as practicable, given the other relevant constraints.
Society would reasonably frown on customization efforts that caused the courts
to abandon this function.
Similarly, in our common law system, courts serve an important function in
articulating the boundaries of current rules, providing guidance to the public at
large about the state of the law. An oversimplification of the dispute resolution
function of courts would label it a wholly “private good”—something solely
benefiting those who engage in the litigation. In the late 1970s, William Landes
and Richard Posner argued that litigation should be viewed not only as a private
good, but also as a “public good”—a product whose benefits are necessarily
enjoyed by all, or at least most.138 Underlying the view that courts are more
134

See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1984) (“The disputeresolution story trivializes the remedial dimensions of lawsuits and mistakenly assumes
judgment to be the end of the process. . . . Often, however, judgment is not the end of a
lawsuit but only the beginning. The involvement of the court may continue almost
indefinitely.”)
135
See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Galanter, supra note ___; Ross E. Cheit &
Jacob E. Gersen, When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State Court
Litigation, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 789 (2000).
136
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
137
See Fiss, supra note ___, at 1083.
138
William Landes & Richard Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235
(1979). Owen Fiss echoes these concerns about preserving the norm-articulation function of
courts in his article, Against Settlement, perhaps the most-cited critique of ADR generally.
See Fiss, supra note ___.
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than mere resolvers of disputes, David Luban observed that “our court system
not only resolves disputes, but also produces rules and precedents. Though
private judges may well be efficient purveyors of dispute resolution, they are
terribly inefficient producers of rules.”139 In short, part of the bargain for
society, part of the reason it agrees to pay so much for its court system is that, in
return for its investment, the public receives the benefit of more clearly
articulated laws and rules.140
Just as society does not always demand final resolution from its courts, nor does
it always demand public articulation from its courts. The default operating
assumption for courts is that they will make their proceedings, their decisions,
and the reasoning behind their decisions available to the public. In limited
circumstances, courts seal some aspects of their proceedings. Similarly, courts
sometimes do not articulate their decisions fully—for example by not
publishing an opinion or by placing some aspect of the decision under a
protective order.141 As a norm, however, the public has access to courts, both
during the adjudication of a particular dispute and afterwards, in the form of a
review of the written record and opinion.
The public would reasonably, therefore, resist efforts at customization that make
it more difficult for the public to derive the benefits of publicity inherent in the
current model of adjudication. We would not approve of sealing a record
merely because it includes information that casts the litigants in unfavorable
light. We would not approve of a rule inviting the trial judge to issue orders
without any explanation—even if both litigants explicitly waived any objection.
The public sees something to gain from the litigation process, and it would be
loathe to invite private litigants to deny those benefits.
2. Efficiency Interests
The public has an interest in how much money is spent on the court system.
Courts are expensive. The modest filing fees charged to litigants cover nowhere
near the full costs of maintaining the judicial system. The functions listed
above justify this level of expenditure, but the judicial branch is not immune to
the budgetary challenges facing all other aspects of government.142 And some
139

David Luban, supra note ___, at 2622.
It is not clear that society is in need of more judicial opinions. Cf. id. at 2628 (“It is not
hard to see where expanding the judicial system takes us: more trial courts generate more
law, along with more inconsistent decisions, more appeals, more efforts by higher courts to
reconcile inconsistencies, and – in short – a buzzing, blooming confusion of legal
information. What began as the Tree of Life ends as the Tower of Babel.”). For a thoughtful,
and more complex, view of the functions of courts, see Marc Galanter, The Day After the
Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 32-37 (1986).
141
For an overview of the issues related to the publication of judicial opinions, see
Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. (2002) http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/80454.pdf.
142
See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Cutting Costs . . . and Courts, A.B.A. J. at 17 (Apr. 2003).
140
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of the arguments in favor of publicly subsidized ADR programs boil down to
efficiency, cost-cutting, and docket management.143 Given the important
functions courts play, we have accepted the idea of providing public funds to
create and sustain the litigation infrastructure for private litigants.
That society has approved of the expenditures of public money on court systems
does not mean that it would subsidize them regardless of their structure or their
cost. The public would almost certainly resist procedural changes that
permitted private litigants to restructure the cadence of litigation in ways that
caused a wasteful increase in the public expenses involved. We would not want
a customization agreement that fundamentally changes the expenditures
required for the court to oversee the litigation. So, for example, private litigants
could not mutually agree to a process that triples the number of days spent in
trial. Similarly, even if both litigants preferred to have a jury of one hundred
jurors, the public would reasonably balk at the added expenditures such a
customized procedure would impose. Although the public has seen fit to
provide certain judicial resources to private litigants at an extraordinary
discount, the public’s subsidies are largely capped and are not a function of
private litigants’ decisions.
The concern over efficiency can be overstated, of course. Litigants routinely
make decisions that cause increased expenditures of public resources. Refusing
to refer a case to a magistrate causes the public to spend more money.144
Taking a case to trial, rather than settling it, costs public money. We allow
lawyers to file objections, to request extra time, and to raise appeals, even
though each of these things results in the public spending some additional
resources. It is not that any decision resulting in the expenditure of money is
impermissible. However, each of these expenses is expressly contemplated in
the current structure of the judicial system.145 What the public would resist are
See also Chief Justice John Roberts, 2005 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary
(“Escalating rents combined with across-the-board cuts imposed during fiscal years 2004 and
2005 resulted in a reduction of approximately 1,500 judicial branch employees as of midDecember when compared to October 2003”); William Rehnquist, 2004 Year-End Report
and the Federal Judiciary (“The continuing uncertainties and delays in the funding process,
along with rising fixed costs that outpace any increased funding from Congress, have
required many courts to impose hiring freezes, furloughs, and reductions in force.”).
143
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Roots and Inspirations: A Brief History of the Foundations
of Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 19 (Michael L. Moffitt &
Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
144
Though cost savings are often cited among the reasons for using Magistrate Judges, I
know of no empirical studies comparing the actual costs of using magistrate judges, as
opposed to district court judges. Even if everything else were constant, however, the salary
differential between the two suggests the prospect of at least some savings.
145
Some decisions by litigants might cause added expenditures of public resources. For
example, if courts upheld private parties’ contractual provisions seeking to provide judicial
review of arbitral award beyond that contemplated in the F.A.A., the courts would be
shouldering additional expense. Cf. Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of
Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171 (2003).
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private customization efforts that cause significant expenditures beyond those
already contemplated.146
3. Symbolic Interests
Courts sometimes serve as a voice of society’s norms and as arbiter of certain
fundamental social differences. To play that role, courts need to have a certain
degree of status. Society has an important interest in preserving the public
perception that courts are legitimate. Customization, therefore, cannot strip
courts of the symbolic features that lend credibility and legitimacy to the
institutions of the judiciary.
Customization cannot undermine the public’s sense of the legitimacy of the
courts. Allowing private disputants to convert the courtroom into a circus in
one case would undermine the ability of the court to perform its important
functions not only in that case, but in other cases as well. Even with the consent
of the litigants, a trial court judge can not be made to preside over a pie-eating
contest as the standard of victory, for example. It is not that society would
necessarily refuse to enforce the results of a private dispute resolution
mechanism that based its decision on the outcome of a pie-eating contest (or
any other otherwise legal mechanisms).147 It is that we would not tolerate
dragging judicial officials into the fray, out of fear that their involvement would
decrease the legitimacy with which their subsequent actions might be perceived.
These concerns would prevent, for example, customization that decreased the
levels of candor required of litigants. Why not permit litigants to agree that
everyone should be allowed to lie to the judge and to each other? Why not
permit them to contract around Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (veracity in
pleadings) or Model Rule 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), for example? The
answer is not that we refuse to tolerate any dispute resolution mechanism in
which knowingly false documents or testimony may be presented.148 Instead, it
146

Perhaps we should contemplate a system that would permit even private litigants to
increase the cost of the judicial function—as long as they underwrite the expenses involved.
Even if litigants genuinely, mutually believed that it was important to have a jury of fifty
members, we would normally refuse such customization, on the grounds of the expenses it
would create. What if the litigants agreed to reimburse the system for the added expenses
involved? Why not permit litigants to buy a “premium” process, if the result were costneutral (or better) for the public?
147
In Spring 2005, Sotheby’s and Christies engaged in a game of rock-paper-scissors to
decide which of the auction houses would receive the right to sell a Japanese company’s art
collection, valued at more than $20 million. See Carol Vogel, Rock, Paper, Payoff: Child’s
Play Wins Auction House an Art Sale, New York Times p.A1, April 29, 2005.
148
For example, within mediation, only the common law of fraud binds parties’ behavior.
For a discussion of the prospect of requiring “good-faith” participation in mediation, see
Roger Carter, Oh Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns, and Commentary on
Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 367; John Lande,
Why Good-Faith Requirement is a Bad Idea for Mediation, 23 ALT. HIGH COSTS LITIG. 1
(2005).
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is that we refuse to drag the good name of our courts into a process so expressly
divorced from the fundamental images of truth-seeking and justice-promotion
on which our courts rest. Put simply, some things “just wouldn’t be proper.”149
However, concern over preserving legitimacy does not mean that the public
would, or should, resist every change to courts or to their procedures.
Legitimacy is not necessarily derived from ancestry. Litigants no longer resolve
disputes by battle, by compurgation, or by ordeal, even though these were once
the procedures by which justice was seen to have been done.150 Indeed, any
court that did those things now would be seen as illegitimate, because of
society’s shifting assessment of the appropriate way for courts to conduct
themselves. That we should preserve the courts’ legitimacy does not mean that
we should reject all customization any more than in means that we should resist
updating procedural rules. We simply must be aware not to undercut the courts’
important standing in society.151
C. Limits Aimed at Preventing Harm to Non-Litigants
In a simple lawsuit, the litigants are the only people whose rights may be
affected by the outcome of the lawsuit.
Recognizing that in some
circumstances, non-litigants may have important, legally cognizable interests at
stake, modern procedure affords certain limited protections to those who are not
initially named as parties to a lawsuit. Such protections form a third category of
limits on the scope of customization. In other words, litigants cannot mutually
craft litigation rules that decrease the protections afforded to non-litigants.
For example, it would be inappropriate for litigants to restructure procedural
rules in ways that would prohibit non-litigants from intervening in litigation in
which their interests are at stake. Under certain circumstances, federal and state
procedural rules allow a non-litigant to parachute into the middle of a fight,

149

Some, like Lon Fuller, might suggest that customization risks robbing litigation of its
“moral integrity.” See LON FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF
LON L. FULLER (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981). Fuller’s notion of processes’ moral integrity
is that each possesses certain fundamental attributes, without which, they cease to hold
together legitimately. Trial looks quite different today than when Fuller articulated
litigation’s moral integrity. It is not clear to me, therefore, that customization is the biggest
challenge to Fuller’s vision.
150
See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 63-67 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing the development of various methods of trial).
151
In the mid-1960s New Jersey trial court judges used to sit with litigants and counsel in an
informal setting, often at a conference room table, to work out various aspects of litigation
planning. After some years of experimentation, the judges were asked to return to wearing
robes and to sit behind the bench for those same conversations. Apparently, litigants and
counsel found it disconcerting to have judges appearing in such an informal manner.
Interview with Dom Vetri in Eugene, Oregon (February 2006).
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even if both of the initial litigants would prefer to keep the intervenor out.152 In
some circumstances, an absentee may be affected by practical harms stemming
from the outcome of the litigation. In others, the risk of stare decisis may
constitute a sufficient prospective harm to demand the compulsory joinder of an
intervenor, even if it is against the will of the existing parties.153 Courts would
appropriately resist any effort at customization that would risk prejudicing those
non-litigants who would enjoy protections under the current intervention rules.
Litigants cannot lock the courthouse doors once they are inside, barring those
who rightfully belong from entering.
Similarly, customization cannot eliminate the formal roles of those assigned to
protect the rights of interested parties who are not otherwise represented. For
example, in many actions involving juvenile and domestic relations, state court
systems appoint a guardian ad litem to provide independent advice to the court
and to promote the interests of the child or children potentially affected by the
legal action.154 The state interest in protecting these non-litigants is strong, and
the guardian ad litem system exists precisely because of the risk that the
existing litigants (for example, the parents) will make decisions that do not
adequately account for the interests of the non-litigants (the children).
Therefore, no private arrangement between the existing litigants can disturb the
role of such a court-appointed actor.
A third example of customization efforts that would fall short on the basis of the
interests of non-litigants involves the role judges assume in certain
representative actions. For example, judges assume a different stance with
respect to settlements in class actions. In a typical dispute, in which each
person with a legally cognizable claim or interest appears as a party to the
dispute, the disputants are essentially free to settle on whatever terms they
prefer. The plaintiff(s) can agree to accept payment from the defendant(s) in
exchange for dismissing the lawsuit, for example. When the underlying
litigation has been certified as a class action, however, it is not merely the rights
of the named parties that are at stake in a settlement. Instead, all members of
the certified class who do not affirmatively opt out of the settlement terms will

152

See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c); Cal. Code Cov. P. §387. For a review of the history of
intervention, see Moore & Levi, Federal Intervention: The Right to Intervene and
Reorganization, 45 YALE L. J. 565 (1936).
153
For a colorful illustration of this principle, see Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. U.S., 376 F.2d 818
(5th Cir. 1967). One party who “claimed” a reef off the coast of Florida brought suit against
the U.S., seeking recognition of the claim. A competitor, who also claimed the reef, sought
to intervene. The court permitted compulsory joinder under 19(a) because the absent party
“had no friend in the litigation” and would have been prejudiced with any outcome if not
permitted to join.
154
See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 51101 et seq.
(2000) (requiring states to provide guardians ad litem to children who are subject to abuse or
neglect proceedings).
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have their rights extinguished in exchange for the settlement terms negotiated
by the class representative and class counsel.155
The fact that the settlement may affect un-named parties raises the prospect of
inappropriate settlement terms in ways that disfavor absent class members. For
example, a defendant could offer the representative of the plaintiff class a
“sweetheart deal”—one that provides a disproportionately attractive benefit to
the representative when compared with the benefit going to un-named class
members.156 We reasonably fear that a defendant may “buy out” the named
plaintiff, prejudicing the interests of the numerous unnamed plaintiffs. As a
result, Rule 23(e) provides that litigants involved in a class action are not free to
settle privately on whatever terms they prefer.157 Once a case is certified as a
class action, the court overseeing the litigation has an obligation to review the
terms of a proposed settlement agreement and to assess its fairness.
Determining a proposed deal’s fairness is, of course, a highly fact-specific,
subjective determination, but it is a critical procedural requirement for assuring
that the rights of class members are adequately protected. It would, therefore,
neither be appropriate policy nor be consistent with Due Process to permit class
representatives to customize litigation rules in a way that retains its status as a
class action but removes the case from the purview of Rule 23(e) or its state
equivalents.
Customized litigation processes do not necessarily need to protect non-litigants
more than the current system does. The current system does not always protect
the interests of all of those who may be affected by the outcome of a particular
piece of litigation. The parties remain primarily in control of the scope of
litigation, even under the current system.158 However, customization cannot be
an avenue for reducing the protections non-litigants currently enjoy. The
interests of those who are not currently parties to the lawsuit, therefore,
represent a third category of constraints on appropriate customization.

155

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The results of a class action are binding on all class members,
even if they did not participate in the litigation or its settlement. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve
Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Note
also that in some cases, courts may approve class actions settlements without any opt-out
provisions. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & County of San
Francisco, 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982).
156
See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF L. REV. 685, 729
(2005) (calling collusive settlement “one of the greatest challenges facing class action
courts”); David Rosenberg, Adding A Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: Cost
Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 37-39 (2003) (describing the risks of both
“sweetheart” and “kickback” deals.).
157
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
158
Just as a plaintiff is “master” of its complaint for purposes of choosing theories of
recovery, for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule, a plaintiff is “master” for purposes
of deciding which defendant(s) to name in the lawsuit. Cf. Fair v. Kohler Die & Spec. Co.,
228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (Justice Holmes’ first naming of the “master of the complaint”
doctrine).
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D. Concerns about Customized Litigation
Increasing litigants’ opportunities to customize their litigation experience is no
panacea. Like any policy change, it presents a combination of tradeoffs, and
observers may disagree about whether the benefits outweigh the costs.
Furthermore, because it represents a significant deviation from prior practices,
some of the effects customized litigation would necessarily remain unknown
until implemented and observed. In this final section, I articulate the three
primary concerns I anticipate from those who would oppose expanding
opportunities for customized litigation. Each objection highlights an important
aspect of litigation. Correctly understood, however, none of them should stand
in the way of permitting customized litigation.
1. The Complexity and Cost of Customization
Objection One. Customization could present unmanageable complexity for
courts. It risks creating more litigation because litigants would now also face
the prospect of fighting about what customized procedure they purportedly
agreed to previously.
Would customization impose costs on the court? Would judges be able to
“handle” the procedural variants litigants might present them? Would
customization spawn an entirely new set of disputes—this time, disputes about
the meaning of agreed-upon customized rules? At some level, each of the
above questions presents an empirical question for which no reliable data exist.
My suspicion, however, is that none of these represents a significant
impediment to the realization of efficiencies—both private and public.
As an initial matter, I am skeptical of concerns that suggest that trial court
judges may not be able to manage efficiently the complications presented by
customized procedures. We routinely require judges to interpret a shifting
patchwork of procedural rules, both because of the ascendancy of inter-system
litigation and because we frequently amend procedural rules. Judges are, in
many ways, ideally positioned to do precisely the task of interpreting
agreements such as those represented by customized procedures.159 The few
areas in which significant customization already exists suggest that customized
procedural rules neither clog nor confuse the judiciary. We have seen no flood
of litigation over the contours of Rule 29 agreements, for example.160 Those
159

Anecdotally, the observers who have raised this concern have uniformly been academics.
The admittedly small and non-random selection of sitting judges with whom I have spoken
on the topic have not expressed this as a concern.
160
I know of no easy way to document the infrequency with which a rule is at the center of a
legal dispute. As a rough measure, I did a basic search in Westlaw and Lexis, seeking any
reported cases in which Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 was cited at all, for any proposition. Despite the
nearly eighty year history of the rule, the search yielded fewer than 150 cases. And on
careful review, more one-third of those cases were actually criminal cases in which the court
intended to refer to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 but erroneously cited Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 instead. A
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discovery disputes that arrive before a court for resolution rarely turn on the
meaning of the discovery rules, and instead tend to turn on the highly factspecific, contextual behavior of the parties. I see no reason to think that the
nature of discovery disputes is made more complex by having litigant-crafted
rules. If anything, the fact that the litigants individually crafted the rules would
suggest that there would be less opportunity for disagreement about their
meaning.
Furthermore, even if there were some initial expense involved in specifying the
meaning of certain customized agreements, I would expect that the cost of
doing so would decrease over time. With arbitration, a relatively small set of
standardized deviations has become popular and is routinely incorporated by
reference. If the same dynamic arises with customized litigation (as I expect it
would), then the cost of each additional dispute would decrease over time. In
short, it may be that an initial investment would be required, but would be
justified by the captured efficiencies.
Finally, even if customized litigation were to produce some marginal increase in
the expense of the judiciary’s functioning, overall efficiency might still be
possible, provided we permit a more creative allocation of the costs of litigation.
Imagine a scenario in which the litigants expect a proposed customized rule to
save each of them $100,000 in litigation expenses. If the customized rule would
create an additional $10,000 in expense for the judicial system, it would be
inefficient to deny the litigants their mutual procedural preference. Why not let
the litigants pay for the “premium” procedures, from which they expect to
derive more benefit than it would cost the courts to provide it? In short, if the
efficiencies private parties expect from a customized procedure might exceed
the increased public expenditures required to give the procedures effect, perhaps
we should develop a mechanism that would allow the private litigants to “buy”
the procedures, to the benefit of both the private and public interests involved.
The suggestion that customized procedures may confuse, overwhelm, or burden
the court system holds intuitive logic. But currently available empirical data—
for example, the experience of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 29—suggest that the concern is
overstated. And even if additional expense were involved, we have no reason to
think that the costs would be so overwhelming as to outweigh the potential
benefits of customization.
2. Fixed Procedures as Prophylaxis
Objection Two. The process of customization could strip litigation of
procedures designed to protect the weakest, least sophisticated parties.

review of the leading Civil Procedure treatises suggests the same conclusion: Rule 29 has not
spawned much litigation at all.
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Some formal aspects of modern civil procedure, of course, are designed to
protect parties who may not be in a position to protect themselves effectively.
Courts appoint guardians ad litem to protect the interests of children. Courts
review proposed class action settlements to assess their fairness toward class
members who are not named representatives. As I make clear in section ___,
above, these aspects of litigation procedure are not among those amenable to
customization. These rules exist precisely because we cannot trust the litigants
themselves to protect the interests of these absent parties.
This objection, however, focuses not on absent parties, but rather on those
parties who are titular participants in the litigation. Does customization risk
stripping away formal procedures designed to protect unsophisticated litigants?
The very bedrock idea of the rule of law is that the same laws should apply to
all people. Under the rule of law, the rich do not operate under a different set of
laws from the poor. Under the rule of law, justice is done by neutral application
of pre-determined rules to the particular facts of a case. If we permit litigants to
bargain over procedures, do we risk undermining the vision that every litigant
receives equal treatment? Are formal litigation procedures not the last bastion
of equality, the last aspect of modern life where all are treated equally?
As an initial matter, I might quibble with the characterization of formal trial
procedures as necessarily protecting the weak and unsophisticated. Pro se
litigants, for example, fare extraordinarily poorly in modern litigation, even
when courts relax some of the rules in order to accommodate their status.
Formal litigation procedures create considerable barriers to entering the justice
system, and disparities in resources commonly affect how the litigation unfolds.
No responsible observer of modern litigation would suggest that wealth is
irrelevant.161
At the same time, instances of extreme disparities in sophistication could lead to
disturbing customization agreements. An unsophisticated (but appropriately
distrusting) litigant would likely simply reject any suggested customization
offers from the opposing side, of course. The current system’s protections
would, therefore, apply. If one party has no basic understanding of how
litigation’s default rules would operate, however, how can that party assess the
merits of any proposed customization? The result could be a customized
procedure that would disfavor the unsophisticated party even more than the
current procedures do.
This concern is most pronounced in contexts in which the litigant is operating
without legal representation. If pro se litigants are the genuine focus of this
concern, perhaps the answer is to limit customization agreements to contexts in
which parties are represented by counsel. Such an approach might present some
challenges in implementation, and it shows more paternalism than I might
161

See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
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generally prefer. Still, I can imagine a reason to address the nightmare of the
pro se litigant being duped on the courthouse steps by a sophisticated opposing
counsel.
I suspect, however, that the true nightmare underlying this critique is not the
wily attorney on the courthouse steps strong-arming an unsuspecting litigant.
Instead, the true nightmare—one I share—is the prospect that courts will find
“consent” to customization in the same way they find “consent” for so-called
“mandatory” arbitration agreements. Under modern arbitration jurisprudence, it
is essentially impossible to turn on a computer, rent a car, use a cell phone, take
a job, or receive medical treatment without being deemed as having accepted an
agreement to arbitrate any and all disputes arising out of those activities. What
would stop companies from inserting questionable “litigation customization
agreements” into adhesion contracts just as they do with arbitration agreements?
To be clear, this kind of pre-dispute agreement is not my vision of
customization. If the choice regarding the validity of pre-dispute customization
were binary (either we permit it for everyone or we don’t permit it for anyone),
I would reluctantly come down on the side of not permitting it. The risks of
mischief are too great. The benefits of customization are made too remote. One
option, therefore, would be to restrict customization to post-dispute
circumstances. Alternatively, I could imagine treating contracting parties
differently. We could permit sophisticated business parties to enter anticipatory
customization agreements, while at the same time refusing to enforce predispute customization contracts in circumstances of more conspicuous power
differentials. Customization need not disrupt the prophylactic function of
formal procedures.
3. The Arbitration Alternative
Objection Three. Why should we care about this?
customize everything, they can just go to arbitration.

If disputants want to

Arbitration offers disputants almost unlimited opportunity to customize their
adjudicative dispute resolution experience. Litigants could receive virtually any
procedural variation I describe above in Section ___ by electing to go to
arbitration. Arbitration parties can limit joinder, curtail discovery, dispense
with the rules of evidence, and virtually eliminate the prospect of appeals. In
fact, arbitration can involve customization unthinkable in litigation. For
example, arbitration parties can reform pleading requirements, set their own
calendar, and choose their own arbitrator. To be sure, therefore, arbitration
offers prospective litigants many of the benefits of customization.162

162

One of the benefits of litigation that is not available to arbitration parties is the depth and
breadth of procedural rules. Arbitration providers have extensive procedures, covering the
most common adjudication issues, but arbitration procedures are nowhere near as
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For at least three reasons, however, the availability of arbitration as a private
alternative to litigation does not negate the need for making litigation
customizable. First, arbitration is not as accessible as the courthouse. Litigants
seeking to enter the judicial system pay only a modest filing fee. Disputants
proceeding through arbitration pay filing fees, administration fees, and
arbitrators’ fees, amounting to considerably more than court fees. If arbitration
were available as a private alternative on the same terms as litigation, then I
might be less concerned. I am not convinced, however, that the private market
(“If people think arbitration is better, let them buy their way into arbitration.”)
is the full solution to providing appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms. We
should be troubled by the prospect that our courts could be reduced to the poorman’s last resort.
Second, this objection assumes that dispute resolution is the only purpose or
benefit relevant to the choice of process. If that were true, then the public and
the litigants should be indifferent to the method used to resolve it. In fact, if it
were only about resolving disputes, then the public might see great benefit to
sending more litigants to arbitration, since it would ease the demand for (and
presumably, the expense of) judicial services. But of course, more is at stake.
Courts perform important functions in society beyond dispute resolution.
Courts articulate community norms. Juries are part of our system of democratic
governance. Courts are the visible symbol of the rule of law in society.163
Making courts unattractive to disputants comes at a real cost.
Finally, I am not persuaded that saying “a private provider could do that” is
really an argument against having the public judiciary providing that function.
(By that logic, “Why pay for police? The mob is offering to protect me for a
small fee, and they seem quite good at it.”) Arbitration may handle some
aspects of dispute resolution better than courts. Rather than deny this, or see
this as immutable fact, we who care about courts should seek to find ways to
have courts learn from arbitration. Courts play important public functions. If
we can improve the way courts perform those functions, why not do so?
CONCLUSION
The idea that disputants ought to enjoy multiple options when it comes to the
resolution of their disputes is not new. In 1976, Chief Justice Warren Burger
convened a collection of judges, practitioners, and scholars for the Pound
Conference on the Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.
At that conference, Professor Frank Sander delivered a seminal speech entitled,
comprehensive as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other legal structures supporting
litigation. Litigation, therefore, can offer a degree of certainty unavailable in arbitration.
163
For more on the important roles of courts and juries in society, see sections II.C. and
IV.B., supra.
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“Varieties of Dispute Processing.”164 Sander’s idea, which later took on the
label “multi-door courthouses,” was that disputants and disputes ought to be
sorted as they enter the courthouse.165 Some would proceed to litigation, but
others would go to mediation, to factfinding, to arbitration, to a screening panel,
or to some other designated dispute resolution process offered at the
courthouse.166 Many credit Sander’s speech with “launching” the modern,
institutionalized ADR movement as we now know it.167 It is certainly rare for a
modern litigant not to encounter opportunities to pursue alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. Indeed, many modern litigants are required to do so.
The idea that one might choose from among different non-litigation processes is
well entrenched. Process pluralism,168 as some have called it, is the rule of the
day.
My suggestion builds on the idea of process pluralism, but suggests that we
ought to embrace and encourage pluralism within a particular dispute resolution
mechanism—litigation. Frank Sander’s idea of the multi-door courthouse (like
virtually all of its modern ADR progeny) would transform litigants into
something else. Litigants become parties to a mediation, or to an arbitration, or
to a fact finding. They become participants in something other than litigation.
For a while, at least, they cease to be litigants. My suggestion is different. I
suggest that we look for ways to keep disputants as litigants, but still offer them
more choices.
The idea of customized litigation is not quite as heretical as it may appear at
first blush. Some may imagine that customization would do injury to our image
164

Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70
F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976).
165
The phrase “multi-door courthouse” does not appear in the text of Sander’s speech. The
phrase is said to have made its first appearance in a magazine article shortly after the Pound
Conference., describing Sander’s speech. Interview with Frank E.A. Sander in Cambridge,
MA (June 2005).
166
See Sander, supra note ___ at 131.
167
See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative
Democracy: A Commentary by and Responses to Professory Carrie Menkel-Meadow: Look
Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of CourtConnected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 402 (2004) (“Sander is now a part of the historical
lore of the ADR movement. Among other ideas offered to address the problems of court
overload, Professor Sander introduced the multi-door courthouse.”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1 (2000). (“Many think of Sander’s speech delivered at the Pound Conference as the
‘founding’ of the ADR movement.”).
168
See LON FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 125 (1972) (describing the need for
different processes to address different disputes); Marc Galanter & John Lande, Private
Courts and Public Authority, 12 STUD. IN L. POL. & SOC’Y. 393 (1992) (describing “process
pluralism”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and
Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 7, 10 (2004) (defining process pluralism and exploring its relationship to the
justice-seeking functions of courts).
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of blind Justice, administering the laws equally to all who come into a court of
law. Admittedly, in the abstract, litigants today enjoy the benefits of the
uniform application of the rule of law. But the reality on the ground is that even
today, no two trials look exactly alike—not only because the particular facts of
the dispute are different, but also because some degree of customization already
happens. Customization already occurs. We should be clearer in naming it as
such, and we should have clearly articulated limits on the scope of permissible
customization.
My argument is that litigants should have even more opportunities to customize
their litigation experience. The current procedural rules should stand as a set of
default rules. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the current set of
procedural rules should govern the litigation. In some disputes, however, all
litigants may mutually prefer a particular adaptation of those baseline
procedural rules. In such cases, the customized rule should govern the
litigation, provided the adaptation does not run afoul of the constitutional or
statutory provisions empowering the court, does not hurt the public’s legitimate
interest in the litigation process, and does not prejudice non-litigants.
Within these proposed parameters, disputants have the opportunity to craft
many different, legitimate processes for resolving their differences—all under
the umbrella of litigation. In the interests of justice, efficiency, and the future of
litigation’s legitimate role within society, we should welcome and encourage
customization.
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